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Abstract 
Secure property rights are considered a key determinant of economic development. The 
evaluation of the causal effects of property rights, however, is a difficult task as their 
allocation is typically endogenous. To overcome this identification problem, we exploit a 
natural experiment in the allocation of land titles. In 1981, squatters occupied a piece of 
land in a poor suburban area of Buenos Aires. In 1984, a law was passed expropriating 
the former owners’ land to entitle the occupants. Some original owners accepted the 
government compensation, while others disputed the compensation payment in the slow 
Argentine courts. These different decisions by the former owners generated an 
exogenous allocation of property rights across squatters. Using data from two surveys 
performed in 2003 and 2007, we find that entitled families substantially increased 
housing investment, reduced household size, and enhanced the education of their 
children relative to the control group. These effects, however, did not take place through 
improvements in access to credit. Our results suggest that land titling can be an 
important tool for poverty reduction, albeit not through the shortcut of credit access, but 
through the slow channel of increased physical and human capital investment, which 
should help to reduce poverty in the future generations. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The fragility of property rights is considered a crucial obstacle for economic development 
(North and Thomas, 1973; North, 1981; De Long and Shleifer, 1993; Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; inter alia). The 
main argument is that individuals underinvest if others can seize the fruits of their 
investments (Demsetz, 1967; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). In today’s developing world, 
a pervasive manifestation of feeble property rights are the millions of people living in 
urban dwellings without possessing formal titles of the plots of land they occupy 
(Deininger, 2003; and Banerjee and Duflo, 2006). The absence of formal property rights 
constitutes a severe limitation for the poor. In addition to its investment effects, the lack 
of formal titles impedes the use of land as collateral to access the credit markets (Feder 
et al., 1988). It also affects the transferability of the parcels (Besley, 1995), making 
investments in untitled parcels highly illiquid. Moreover, the absence of formal titles 
deprives poor families of the possibility of having a valuable insurance and savings tool 
that could provide protection during bad times and retirement, forcing them instead to 
rely on extended family members and offspring as insurance mechanisms.  
 
Land-titling programs have been recently advocated in policy circles as a powerful 
intervention to rapidly reduce poverty. De Soto (2000) emphasizes that the lack of 
property rights impedes the transformation of the wealth owned by the poor into capital. 
Proper titling could allow the poor to collateralize the land. In turn, this credit could be 
invested as capital in productive projects, promptly increasing labor productivity and 
income. Inspired by these ideas, and fostered by international development agencies, 
land-titling programs have been launched throughout developing and transition 
economies as part of poverty alleviation efforts. 
 
In this paper, we investigate the effects of issuing land titles to a very deprived 
population. The identification of land-titling effects, however, is a difficult task because it 
typically faces the problem that formal property rights are endogenous. The allocation of 
property rights across households is usually not random but based on wealth, family 
characteristics, individual effort, previous investment levels, or other mechanisms built 
on differences between the groups that acquire those rights and the groups that do not. 
We address this selection problem exploiting a natural experiment that provides us with 
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a source of variability in the allocation of property rights that is exogenous to the squatter 
and parcel characteristics. 
 
In 1981, a group of squatters occupied an area of wasteland in the outskirts of Buenos 
Aires, Argentina. The area was composed of different tracts of land, each with a different 
legal owner. An expropriation law was subsequently passed, ordering the transfer of the 
land from the original owners to the state in exchange for a monetary compensation, with 
the purpose of entitling it to the squatters. However, only some of the original legal 
owners surrendered the land. The parcels located on the ceded tracts were transferred 
to the squatters with legal titles that secured the property of the parcels. Other original 
owners, instead, are still disputing the government compensation in the slow Argentine 
courts. As a result, a group of squatters obtained formal land rights, while others are 
currently living in the occupied parcels without paying rent, but without legal titles. Both 
groups share the same household pre-treatment characteristics. Moreover, they live next 
to each other, and the parcels they inhabit are identical. Since the decision of the original 
owners of accepting or disputing the expropriation payment was orthogonal to the 
squatter characteristics, the allocation of property rights is exogenous in equations 
describing the behavior of the occupants. Thus, this natural experiment provides a 
control group that estimates what would have happened to the treated group in the 
absence of the intervention, allowing us to identify the causal effects of land titling. 
 
Exploiting this natural experiment, we find significant effects on housing investment, 
household size, and child education. The constructed surface increases by 12%, while 
an overall index of housing quality rises by 37%. Moreover, households in the titled 
parcels have a smaller size (an average of 5.11 members relative to 6.06 in the untitled 
group), both through a diminished presence of extended family members and a reduced 
fertility of the household heads. In addition, the children from the households that 
reduced fertility show significantly better educational achievement, with an average of 
0.69 more years of schooling and twice the completion rate of secondary education 
(53% vs. 26%). However, we only find modest effects on access to credit markets as a 
result of entitlement, and no improvement in labor market performance of the household 
heads. 
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Several studies have documented the effects of land property rights and titling programs 
on different variables. A partial listing includes Jimenez (1984), Alston et al. (1996) and 
Lanjouw and Levy (2002) on real estate values; Besley (1995), Brasselle et al. (2002), 
Field (2005), and Do and Iyer (2008) on investment; Banerjee et al. (2002) and Libecap 
and Lueck (2008) on agricultural productivity, Field (2007) on labor supply; Feder et al. 
(1988), Place and Migot-Adholla (1998), Carter and Olinto (2002), Field and Torero 
(2003) on access to credit, and Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrodsky (2007) on the 
formation of beliefs. Our strong results on investment and our weak results on access to 
credit coincide with the findings of this preceding literature. To the best of our 
knowledge, the causal effects of land titling on household structure and educational 
achievement had not been previously analyzed. 
 
Our results suggest that land titling can be an important tool for poverty reduction, albeit 
not through the shortcut of credit access and entrepreneurial income, but through the 
slow channel of increased physical and human capital investment. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the natural 
experiment. Section III describes our data, and section IV discusses the identification 
methods. Section V presents our empirical results, while section VI concludes. 
 
II. A Natural Experiment 
 
The empirical evaluation of the effects of land titling poses a major methodological 
challenge. The allocation of property rights across families is typically not random but 
based on wealth, family characteristics, individual effort, previous investment levels, or 
other selective mechanisms. Thus, the individual characteristics that determine the 
likelihood of receiving land titles are probably correlated with the outcomes under study. 
Since some of these personal characteristics are unobservable, this correlation creates a 
selection problem that obstructs the proper evaluation of the effects of property right 
acquisition. 
 
In this paper, we address this selection problem by exploiting a natural experiment in the 
allocation of property rights. In 1981, about 1,800 families occupied a piece of wasteland 
in San Francisco Solano, County of Quilmes, in the Province of Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
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The occupants were groups of landless citizens organized through a Catholic chapel. As 
they wanted to avoid creating a shantytown, they partitioned the occupied land into small 
urban-shaped parcels. At the beginning of the occupation the squatters believed that the 
land belonged to the state, but it was actually private property.1 The occupants resisted 
several attempts of eviction during the military government. After Argentina's return to 
democracy, the Congress of the Province of Buenos Aires passed Law Nº 10.239 in 
1984 expropriating these lands from the former owners to allocate them to the squatters. 
Figure 1 presents a timeline of the events in our study. 
 
Figure 1 – Timeline of Events 
 
 
According to the expropriation law, the government would pay a monetary compensation 
to the former owners and it would then allocate the land to the squatters. In order to 
qualify for receiving the titles, the squatters should have arrived to the parcels at least 
one year before the sanctioning of the law, should not possess any other property, and 
should use the parcel as their family home. Within each household, the titles would be 
awarded to both the household head identified at that time and to her/his spouse (if 
                                                           
1
 This is explained by the squatters in the documentary movie “Por una tierra nuestra” by 
Cespedes (1984). On the details of the land occupation process also see Briante (1982), CEUR 
(1984), Izaguirre and Aristizabal (1988), and Fara (1989). Information on the land expropriation 
process was obtained from the Land Secretary of the Province of Buenos Aires, the office of the 
General Attorney of the Province of Buenos Aires, the Quilmes County Government, the Land 
Registry, and the judicial cases. Additional information presented in this section was gathered 
through a series of interviews with key informants, including the Secretary of Land of the Province 
of Buenos Aires (Maria de la Paz Dessy), Undersecretary of Land of the Province of Buenos 
Aires (Alberto Farias), Directors of Land of Quilmes County (Daniel Galizzi and Alejandro Lastra), 
Secretary of Public Works and Land Registry of Quilmes County (Hector Lucas), General 
Attorney of the Province of Buenos Aires (Ricardo Szelagowski), attorney in expropriation offers’ 
office (Claudio Alonso), lawyer on expropriation lawsuit (Horacio Castillo), former land owners 
(Hugo Spivak and Alejandro Bloise -heir-), squatters (Juan Carlos Sanchez and Jorge Valle, inter 
alia), and President of NGO Gestion Urbana (Estela Gutierrez). 
Land 
Occupation 
 1984 
Former Owners Decide to 
Surrender or Challenge 
Surveys 
 
Final Verdict in one Lawsuit. 
Late Titles Transferred. 
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married or cohabitating). The law also established that the squatters could not transfer 
the property of the parcels for the first ten years after titling. 
 
The process of expropriation resulted to be asynchronous and incomplete. The occupied 
area turned out to be composed of thirteen tracts of land belonging to different owners. 
In 1986, the government offered each owner (or group of co-owners, as several tracts of 
land had more than one owner) a payment proportional to the official valuation of each 
tract of land, indexed by inflation. These official valuations, assessed by the tax authority 
to calculate property taxes, had been set before the land occupation. After the 
government made the compensation offers, the owner/s of each tract had to decide 
whether to surrender the land (accepting the expropriation compensation) or to start a 
legal dispute. Eight former owners accepted the compensation offered by the 
government. Five former owners, instead, did not accept the government offer and filed 
charges with the aim of obtaining a higher compensation. In 1989, the tracts of land of 
the former owners that accepted the government compensation were transferred to the 
squatters occupying them, together with formal land titles that secured the property of 
the parcels.2 The squatters that received titles in 1989 constitute the early-treated group 
in our study.3 
 
                                                           
2
 The “new” urban design traced by the squatters differed from the previous land tract divisions. 
Thus, some “new” parcels overlapped over tracts of land that belonged to more than one former 
owner. This could be interpreted as further evidence of the squatters’ ignorance about the 
previous land ownership status. Had they known the existence of different private owners, they 
should have followed the previous land design to avoid being exposed to the decisions of two or 
three landowners rather than one. For regulatory reasons, parcels could not be delimited and 
titled if one portion of them was still under dispute. 
3
 The market value of land parcels comparable to the ones titled to the squatters amounted to 
approximately 7.4 times the monthly average total household income for the first quintile of the 
official household survey (EPH) of October 1986 for the Buenos Aires metropolitan area (market 
value of parcels in the neighboring non-squatted area obtained from evidence presented in 
“Kraayenbrink de Beurts et al. v. Province of Buenos Aires”). This figure, however, constitutes 
only an upper bound of the differential wealth transfer received by the entitled households for 
three reasons. First, the expropriation law established that each titled squatter had to pay the 
government the proportionally prorated share of the official valuation of the occupied tract of land. 
The law, however, established that the payments should be made in monthly installments that 
could never surpass 10% of the (observable) household income and there was no indexation for 
inflation. Given the hyperinflationary periods experienced by the Argentine economy during the 
period of analysis and the high labor informality of this population, the real values paid by the 
squatters were probably quite small. In practice, there are no records of the amounts and dates of 
the payments made by each household. Second, entitled households are supposed to regularly 
pay property taxes. Third, untitled squatters pay no rent. 
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The people who occupied parcels located on the tracts of land that belonged to the 
former owners that accepted the expropriation compensation, were ex-ante similar, and 
arrived at the same time, than the people who settled on the tracts of the former owners 
that did not surrender the land. There was simply no way for the occupants to know ex-
ante, at the time of the occupation, which parcels of land had owners who would accept 
the compensation and which parcels had owners who would dispute it. In fact, at the 
time of the occupation the squatters believed that all the land was state-owned and they 
could not know that an expropriation law was going to be passed, nor what was going to 
be the future response of the owner of each specific parcel. 
 
A potential concern, however, is that the different former owners’ decisions could reflect 
differences in land quality. In turn, these differences could be correlated with squatters’ 
heterogeneity. For example, more powerful squatters could have settled in the best 
parcels. An advantage of our experiment is that the parcels of land in the treatment 
(titled) and control (untitled) groups are almost identical and basically next to each other. 
Indeed, after the data description, we show in Section IV that there are no differences in 
observable parcel characteristics (distance to a polluted creek, distance to the closest 
non-squatted area, parcel size, location in a corner of a block) between the treatment 
and control groups.4 We also show that there are no differences in pre-treatment 
observable household characteristics (age, gender, nationality and years of education of 
the person who was the household head at the time of the occupation, and nationality 
and years of education of her/his parents). Importantly, all the evidence on the 
occupation process (the documentary movie, the articles, the judicial files, and the 
interviews with squatters, lawyers and former owners described in footnote 1) coincide 
that the squatters had no direct contact with the former owners to influence their 
decisions. Moreover, the dwellings constructed by the squatters had to be explicitly 
ignored in the calculation of the expropriation compensation, and the government offers 
were very similar (in per-square-meter terms) for the accepting and contesting owners, in 
accordance with the proximity and alikeness of the land tracts.5 
                                                           
4
 There are also no differences in altitude. The Buenos Aires metropolitan area is totally flat and 
all these parcels are within the same 5-meter topographical range. Besides, as this is urban land, 
agricultural productivity is not an issue. 
5
 In Argentine pesos (of January 1986) per square meter, the accepted offers had a mean of 
0.424 and a median of 0.391. The contested offers had a mean of 0.453 and a median of 0.397. 
Indeed, the similitude of the offers is repeatedly used as an argument by the government 
attorneys in the expropriation lawsuits to demonstrate that the government offers were fair, as 
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Given the similarity in land quality and compensation offers, the different responses 
might instead reflect heterogeneity of the former owners regarding decision-making, 
subjective land value, or litigation costs. Although thirteen tracts of land provide a small 
number for a statistical analysis, a few patterns emerge. The average number of co-
owners in the groups of accepting owners is 1.25, while the average number of co-
owners for the contested tracts is 2.2. Moreover, when we defined a dummy equal to 1 if 
there is more than one co-owner sharing the same family name, and 0 otherwise, the 
average for this dummy for the accepting owners is 0.125 while the average for the 
challenging owners is 0.6. Thus, it appears that having many co-owners and several in 
the same family made it more difficult for the owners to agree on accepting the 
government offer.6 Note that if, in spite of this discussion, one may still fear that the 
challenging owners did so because the unobservable quality of their land was higher, 
that would imply that the squatters that did not receive titles are standing on land of 
better quality. 
 
As explained, five former owners did not accept the compensation offered by the 
government and went to trial. In these lawsuits, all the legal discussion hinges around 
the determination of the monetary compensation. The Congress constitutionally 
approved the law and, thus, the expropriation itself could not be challenged. The 
squatters had no participation in these legal processes (the lawsuits were exclusively 
between the former owners and the provincial government), and the value of the 
dwellings they constructed was explicitly excluded from the dispute over the monetary 
compensation (“Cordar SRL v. Province of Buenos Aires”). One of these five lawsuits 
ultimately ended with a final verdict, and the squatters on this tract of land received titles 
in 1998 (the late treated). The other four lawsuits are still pending in the slow Argentine 
courts. If one is still worried about the possibility that the former owners’ decisions of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
they were similar to the ones accepted by other owners. The same argument is utilized in a low-
court verdict in “Kraayenbrink de Beurts et al. v. Province of Buenos Aires” citing jurisprudence of 
the Supreme Court. 
6
 Kaplan et al. (2006) find that cases are less likely to be settled (more likely to go to court) when 
they involve multiple plaintiffs. See also Fiss (1984). On family economic decisions see, for 
example, Burkart et al. (2003) and Bennedsen et al. (2007). Within the challenging owners, we 
also found one case in which an owner was a lawyer who was representing himself in the case 
(which may suggest lower litigation costs), while in another case, one of the original owners had 
passed away before the sanctioning of the law but her inheritance process was still under way at 
the time the family had to make a decision. 
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surrendering or suing was correlated with land quality or squatters’ characteristics, then 
an additional feature of this experience is that it allows us to separately compare the 
squatters in this late-treated group relative to the control group. Although these two 
groups of squatters settled in tracts of land which are homogenous regarding their 
respective former owners’ decisions of going to trial, one group already received titles 
while the other is still waiting for the end of the legal processes.7 
 
The final outcome of this expropriation process is that a group of families now has legal 
property rights, while another group is still living in the occupied parcels enjoying free 
usufructuary rights but without possessing formal land titles. This allocation of land titles 
was the result of an expropriation process that did not depend on any particular 
characteristic of the squatters nor of the parcels of land they occupied. Thus, by 
comparing the groups that received and did not receive land titles, we can act as if we 
have a randomized experiment. 
 
III. Data Collection 
 
The area affected by Expropriation Law Nº 10.239 covers a total of 1,839 parcels. 1,082 
of these parcels are located in a contiguous set of blocks. However, the law also 
included another non-contiguous (but close) piece of land currently called San Martin 
neighborhood, which comprises 757 parcels. As this area is physically separated from 
the rest, we focus on the 1,082 contiguous parcels to improve comparability. 
 
We have precise knowledge of the titling status of each parcel. Land titles were awarded 
in two phases. Property titles were awarded to the occupants of 419 parcels in 1989, 
and to the occupants of 173 parcels in 1998. Land titles are not available to the families 
living in 410 parcels located on tracts of land that have not been surrendered to the 
government in the expropriation process. Finally, there are 80 parcels that were not titled 
because the squatters occupying them had not fulfilled some of the required registration 
                                                           
7
 We can still wonder, within this group of former owners that disputed the compensation, why 
some are still on trial while one concluded. Exogenous reasons lengthened the pending trials. In 
two cases, the expropriation lawsuit was delayed by the death of one of the former owners, which 
required an inheritance process. In another case (mentioned in footnote 6) one of the original 
owners had died just before the sanctioning of the law and her inheritance process had not 
finished. In the fourth case, the legal process was delayed by a mistake made in the description 
of the land tract in a low-court judge’s verdict. 
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steps, or had moved or died at the time of the title offers, although the original owners 
had surrendered these pieces of land to the government. This subgroup constitutes the 
“non-compliers” in our study, since they were offered the treatment (land title) but they 
did not receive it.8 
 
Two surveys performed in 2003 and 2007 provide the data utilized for this study. In 
2003, the inhabitants of 590 randomly selected parcels (out of the total of 1,839) were 
interviewed. 617 households living in these 590 parcels (27 parcels host more than one 
family) were surveyed. Excluding the non-contiguous San Martin neighborhood, we 
interviewed 467 households living in 448 parcels. The questionnaire covered 
socioeconomic variables including household structure, labor market outcomes, and 
credit information. At the same time, we sent a team of architects to measure housing 
investments by performing an outside evaluation of the characteristics of the dwellings in 
all the parcels.9 
 
The 245 families in the contiguous area that were identified in the 2003 survey as having 
arrived to the current parcels before the treatment assignment (see next section) and as 
having offspring of the household head of 0-16 years of age, were the target of the 2007 
survey. This second survey aimed to measure the school achievement of the sample of 
701 children satisfying these conditions (who by then were between 4-20 years old) as 
they progressed throughout the educational system. 217 of these 245 households (633 
of these 701 children) were successfully re-interviewed.10 
                                                           
8
 23 of these 80 parcels could have been titled in 1989, while the other 57 correspond to the 
group titled in 1998. The 757 parcels of San Martin, which belonged to an owner who accepted 
the expropriation compensation without suing, were offered for titling in 1991. 712 were titled, 
while 45 correspond to non-compliers. 
9
 Gestion Urbana, an NGO that works in this area, carried out the household survey and the 
housing evaluation. We distributed food stamps for each answered survey as a token of gratitude 
to the families willing to participate in our study. In 10 percent of the cases, the survey could not 
be performed because there was nobody at home in three visit attempts, the parcel was not used 
as a house, rejection, or other reasons. These parcels were randomly replaced. Non-response 
rates were similar for titled and untitled parcels. 
10
 The NGO Gestion Urbana also conducted the education survey, distributing again food stamps 
for each answered survey. Re-interviewing was greatly facilitated by our collection of exact name, 
date of birth, national ID number, address, and parents’ given names for the offspring of the 
household heads in the first survey. Re-interview rates were similar for titled and untitled parcels. 
When a family had moved from their 2003 location, surveyors attempted to find the target family 
using the 2003 data and the information provided by the current occupants. 7 of the 217 families 
were interviewed in this way.  
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IV. Identification Strategy 
 
We seek to identify the effect of the allocation of property rights on several outcome 
variables exploiting a natural experiment in the allocation of land titling. In a natural 
experiment, like in a randomized trial, there is a control group that estimates what would 
have happened to the treated group in the absence of the intervention, but nature or 
other exogenous forces determine treatment status instead. The validity of the control 
group is evaluated by examining the exogeneity of treatment status with respect to the 
potential outcomes, and by testing that the pre-intervention characteristics of the 
treatment and control groups are reasonably similar. In section II we discussed at length 
the process of allocation of land title offers and argued that this process was exogenous 
to the characteristics of the squatters in our experiment. We now test the similarity of 
pre-treatment characteristics between the treatment and control groups. 
 
In Table 1, we compare pre-treatment characteristics for the non-intention-to-treat and 
intention-to-treat groups to analyze the presence of potential differences. The variable 
Property Right Offer equals 1 for the parcels that were surrendered by the original 
owners, and 0 otherwise. In Panel A, we compare parcel characteristics: distance to a 
nearby (polluted and floodable) creek, distance to the closest non-squatted area, parcel 
size, and a dummy for whether the parcel is located in a corner of a block. We only reject 
the hypotheses of equality for parcel size (at the 8.9% level of significance). 
Nevertheless, the difference in average parcel sizes between these two groups is 
relatively small –parcels are only 3% larger in the non-intention-to-treat group– and if 
something, it is the control group the one that inhabits slightly larger parcels. 
 
In Panel B of Table 1, we compare pre-treatment characteristics of the “original squatter” 
between the non-intention-to-treat and intention-to-treat groups for the families that 
arrived before treatment. We define the “original squatter” as the household head at the 
time the family arrived to the parcel they are currently occupying. We cannot reject the 
hypotheses of equality in age, gender, nationality and years of education of the original 
squatter, suggesting a strong similarity between these groups at the time of their arrival 
to this area. Moreover, we do not reject the hypotheses of equality in nationality and 
years of education of the mother and father of the original squatter across the groups, 
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suggesting that these groups had been showing similar trends in their socio-economic 
development before their arrival to this area.11 The similarity across pre-treatment 
characteristics is consistent with the exogeneity in the allocation of property rights 
described above.  
 
Table 1 – Pre-Treatment Characteristics 
 
Property Right 
Offer=0 
Property Right 
Offer=1 
Difference 
 
A. Characteristics of the Parcel 
Distance to Creek 
(in blocks) 
1.995 
(0.061) 
1.906 
(0.034) 
0.088     
(0.070) 
Distance to Non-Squatted 
Area (in blocks) 
1.731      
(0.058) 
1.767     
(0.033) 
-0.036 
(0.067) 
Parcel Size 
(in squared meters) 
287.219     
(4.855) 
277.662     
(2.799) 
9.556*     
(5.605) 
Block Corner=1 
0.190     
(0.019) 
0.156      
(0.014) 
0.033     
(0.023) 
B. Characteristics of the Original Squatter 
Age  
48.875 
(0.938) 
50.406 
(0.761) 
-1.532 
(1.208) 
Female=1 
0.407 
(0.046) 
0.353 
(0.035) 
0.054 
(0.058) 
Argentine=1 
0.903 
(0.028) 
0.904 
(0.022) 
-0.001 
(0.035) 
Years of Education  
6.071 
(0.188) 
5.995 
(0.141) 
0.076 
(0.235) 
Argentine Father=1 
0.795 
(0.038) 
0.866 
(0.025) 
-0.072 
(0.046) 
Years of Education of the 
Father  
4.655 
(0.147) 
4.417 
(0.076) 
0.237 
(0.165) 
Argentine Mother=1 
0.804 
(0.038) 
0.856 
(0.026) 
-0.052 
(0.046) 
Years of Education of the 
Mother  
4.509 
(0.122) 
4.548 
(0.085) 
-0.039 
(0.149) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. 
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 In 23 percent of the cases, the current household head does not coincide with the original 
squatter, either because she/he arrived later than the first member of the family that occupied the 
parcel, or because she/he arrived at the same time but was not the household head at the arrival 
time. This percentage is similar for the treatment and control groups. We obtain similar results 
when we compare the pre-treatment characteristics of the current household head between the 
two groups. 
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Once treatment status has been shown to be exogenous, estimation of average 
treatment effects is straightforward. Operationally, we analyze the effect of land titling on 
variable Y by estimating the following regression model: 
 
iiii
εβγα +++= X Right Property Y    (1) 
 
where Y is any of the outcomes under study, and γ is the parameter of interest, which 
captures the causal effect of Property Right (a dummy variable that equals 1 for the 
squatters that received property titles, and 0 otherwise) on the outcome under 
consideration.12 X is a vector of pre-treatment parcel and original squatter 
characteristics, and ε is the error term.13 
 
A typical concern when conducting statistical inference after estimating the parameters 
of equation (1) is that the errors in that equation might not be independent across 
households. In order to control for this potential nuisance, we also compute robust 
standard errors by clustering the parcels located in the same block and the parcels 
belonging to the same former owner.14 These standard errors are also robust to lack of 
homoskedasticity in the error term. For the education regressions, which comprise more 
than one child per household, we also cluster the standard errors at the household 
level.15 
                                                           
12
 Some of the variables under study are Limited Dependent Variables (LDV). The problem of 
causal inference with LDV is not fundamentally different from the problem of causal inference with 
continuous outcomes. If there are no covariates or the covariates are sparse and discrete, linear 
models (and associated estimation techniques like 2SLS) are no less appropriate for LDV than for 
other types of dependent variables. This is certainly the case in a natural experiment where 
controls are only included to improve efficiency, but their omission would not bias the estimates of 
the parameters of interest. 
13
 Our estimates show no change if we include as controls the personal characteristics of the 
current household head instead of those of the original squatter, when they differ. 
14
 For the former owner clustering, if a set of parcels overlaps on the borders of the previous tract 
divisions, occupying a piece of land that belonged to one owner and another piece that 
corresponded to another owner, the former owner is defined as the combination of the two former 
owners. For the block clustering, a block is defined as both sides of the segment of a street 
between two corners. These procedures define 18 former owner clusters and 83 block clusters. 
Similar results are obtained using other clustering units, such as each sidewalk of a block or the 
rectangular block delimited by consecutive streets, or by block-bootstrapping the t-test statistic to 
better approximate the finite sample distribution of our estimators when we allow for the 
possibility of lack of independence in the error terms within parcels belonging to the same former 
owner. These other specifications are available from the authors upon request. 
15
 We also consider the possibility that the treatment received by one unit could affect the 
outcomes of other units. In particular, we explore whether titling not only affected the titled parcels 
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To this point, our model has assumed that all the squatters actually received the 
treatment to which they were assigned. In many experiments, however, a portion of the 
participants fail to follow the treatment protocol, a problem termed treatment non-
compliance. In our case, this might be of potential concern since a number of families 
that were offered the possibility of obtaining land titles did not receive them for reasons 
that may also affect their outcomes. In order to address this problem of non-compliance, 
we also report the reduced-form estimates from regressing the outcomes of interest on 
the intention-to-treat Property Right Offer variable, a dummy indicating the availability of 
land title offers, and also the 2SLS estimates of the treatment effects from instrumenting 
the Property Right variable with the Property Right Offer variable. 
 
Finally, in any investigation where the impact takes time to materialize (like the 
investment, household size and long-term education achievement considered in this 
paper), some participants will inevitably drop out from the analysis. For example, the 
most widely used longitudinal dataset in economics, the Michigan Panel Study on 
Income Dynamics, has experienced a 50 percent sample loss from cumulative attrition 
after 30 years from its initial sample (see Fitzgerald et al., 1998).16 Participation attrition, 
hence, is another potential problem that might bias the estimates of causal effects in 
long-term studies. 
 
In our 2003 survey, we asked each family the time of arrival to the parcel they are 
currently occupying, and found that some families arrived after the (early) treatment was 
assigned, i.e. after the former owners made, during 1986, the decision of surrender the 
land or sue. From the sample of 467 interviewed households, we found that 313 families 
                                                                                                                                                                             
but also the nearest untitled parcels through spillover effects. This possibility is analyzed by 
splitting the control group into parcels up to or more than two blocks away from the nearest titled 
parcel. Not only our results remain unchanged but also we do not find significant differences 
between the two groups of control parcels considered. Moreover, for the education outcomes, 
which are estimated at the child level and for which we have each child’s family name, we follow 
Angelucci et al (2010) and aim to model intra-family spillovers splitting the control group between 
those children who share their family name with a child in the treatment group and those that do 
not. This exercise is done, however, under the limitation that in Argentina individuals do not carry 
both paternal and maternal family names, but almost exclusively the paternal family name (in our 
sample, only 1.75% of the children carry two family names, but even in those cases both names 
could correspond to the father). Again, our results do not change and there are no significant 
differences between the two types of control units considered in these econometric exercises. All 
these results are also available from the authors upon request. 
16  
See also, for example, Alderman et al. (2003) and Behrman et al. (2003).  
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had arrived to the parcel before the end of 1985, while 154 families arrived after 1985.17 
As it is plausible to argue that the families that arrived after the former owners’ decisions 
could have known the different expropriation status (i.e., the different probabilities of 
receiving the land) associated to each parcel, in order to guarantee exogeneity we need 
to exclude from the analysis the families that arrived to the parcel they are currently 
occupying after 1985. Once this exclusion is made, there is basically no variability (nor 
differences between treatment and control groups) in our sample in the year of arrival of 
the households to the parcels they are currently occupying. 
 
This raises, however, a problem of attrition. If some families arrived after 1985, they 
could have replaced some original squatters in our treatment and control parcels that 
had left before we ran our survey in 2003.18 Moreover, the availability of titles (combined 
with the ten-year limitation to legally transfer titled parcels) could have affected 
household migration decisions. Indeed, column (1) of Table 2 shows that 62.4 percent of 
the parcels in the non-intention-to-treat group are inhabited by families that arrived 
before 1986, while the proportion is 70.0 percent for the intention-to-treat group in the 
second column.19 
Table 2 – Household Attrition 
Variables 
Property 
Right 
Offer=0 
(1) 
Property 
Right 
Offer=1 
(2) 
Property 
Right Offer 
1989=1 
(3) 
Property 
Right Offer 
1998=1 
(4) 
Household arrived before 
1986=1 
0.624     
(0.036) 
0.700    
(0.028) 
0.729     
(0.051) 
0.689     
(0.033) 
Difference relative to 
column (1) 
 
-0.076*     
(0.045) 
-0.105*     
(0.063) 
-0.064     
(0.049) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. 
                                                           
17
 To identify with accuracy the time of arrival of each family to the parcel they are currently 
occupying, our survey asked where the original squatter was living when Diego Maradona scored 
the ‘Hand of God’ goal in the 1986 World Cup game against England. It is impossible for an 
Argentine not to remember where she/he was on that day (Amis, 2004). 
18
 For the families that arrived after 1985, our questionnaire attempted to collect information on 
the names and destination of the previous occupants of the parcels. In both treatment and control 
parcels, the current occupants could provide a name and/or destination of the previous occupant 
only for less than 20 percent of the cases. Although the information obtained is not sufficient to 
allow us to analyze migration decisions as an outcome of independent interest, it does not 
suggest that the households that left the untitled parcels moved to richer areas than the families 
that left the titled parcels. Interestingly, when we asked in these cases whether the current 
inhabitants rent the house from a previous occupant, we found -although the number of cases is 
very small- that renting is significantly more frequent in titled parcels.  
19
 These survival rates could be overestimating attrition by assuming that there were no vacated 
parcels left after the occupation. 
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Of course, the migration decision could be potentially correlated with the outcomes 
under study. We exploit two alternative strategies to address this potential nuisance. Our 
first strategy takes advantage of the asynchronous timing in the titling process to 
consider, separately, the early and late treatment groups. Although, relative to the 
control group, the third column of Table 2 shows a significant difference in attrition for the 
parcels titled in 1989 (early treatment), the last column shows no statistically significant 
difference for the parcels titled in 1998 (late treatment). Moreover, the unobservable 
variables that might have affected migration decisions are, a priori, more likely to be 
ignorable when comparing the control and late treatment groups than when comparing 
the control and early treatment groups. This is so because the squatters titled in 1998 
were under the same conditions as those in the control group for 17 out of the 22 years 
elapsed from the land invasion to the time of our 2003 survey, so we should expect them 
to have broadly similar experiences. Indeed, most of the out-migration for these two 
groups occurred during the interim period they were both untitled. The survival rates for 
the late titled and control groups since 1997 (i.e., just before the late treated received 
titles) are 0.958 (s.e. 0.014) and 0.939 (s.e. 0.017), respectively. Thus, the estimated 
effects of land titling for the late titled group are unlikely to be biased by attrition. 
Additionally, the comparison of these coefficients with those corresponding to the 
estimated effects of land titling for the early treated group leads to an indirect test of 
whether attrition in the latter group is also ignorable. 
 
A more standard strategy assumes the data are missing at random conditional on 
observable characteristics. The idea is then to compare the outcomes for treated and 
control survivors with similar pre-treatment characteristics. This approach leads to 
matching methods based on the propensity score of sample selection. The validity of this 
strategy requires that at least one of the pre-treatment characteristics predicts attrition. 
The only pre-treatment characteristics available for the whole set of squatters (attrited 
and non-attrited) are the parcel characteristics reported in Panel A of Table 1. We 
estimate a Logit model of the likelihood of survival since 1985 on these parcel 
characteristics, and find that the distance to the nearby polluted and floodable creek has 
a positive and statistically significant effect on this likelihood. We exploit the variability in 
attrition induced by this pre-treatment characteristic to correct for sample selection. 
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We implement the matching selection correction by means of the method of stratification 
matching. We estimate the propensity scores and then, keeping fixed the estimated 
scores across variables and specifications, we eliminate observations outside the 
common support of the estimated propensity score for the distributions of titled and 
untitled groups. Next, we divide the range of variation of the propensity score in intervals 
such that within each interval, treated and control units tend to have on average the 
same propensity score. Then, the difference between the average outcomes of the 
treated and the controls is computed within each interval. The parameter of interest is 
finally obtained as an average of the estimates of each interval weighted by the share of 
treated units in each interval on all treated units. 
 
V. Results 
 
In this section we investigate the causal effect on housing investment, household 
structure, human capital accumulation, access to credit, and labor earnings, of providing 
squatters with formal titles of the parcels of land they occupy. This is the treatment of 
interest in policy analysis in the developing world, where most interventions consist of 
titling occupied tracts of land to the current inhabitants.20 
 
Ownership of property gives its owner multiple rights. In its most complete form, they 
include the rights to use the asset, to exclude others from using it, to transfer the assets 
to others, and to persist in these rights (Barzel, 1997). In our natural experiment, the 
entitled households acquired full property rights (with the only restriction that the parcels 
cannot be legally transferred for the first ten years after titling). The untitled households, 
instead, are still living in the occupied parcels without paying rent and property taxes, but 
they are uncertain about when and if the parcels will be titled. Moreover, the untitled may 
feel uncertain about which member of the household would receive the title, and they 
may fear the occupation of their parcels by new squatters before titling. In the meantime, 
the untitled cannot legally transfer their usufructuary rights. 
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 Whether the provision of land titles to squatters in this area could have encouraged new 
squatting (and therefore, violation of landowners’ property rights) in other zones is beyond the 
scope of our study, but should not be ignored in the evaluation of the overall impact of this type of 
interventions. 
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V.1. Effects on Housing Investment 
 
The possession of land titles may affect the incentives to invest in housing construction 
through several concurrent mechanisms. The traditional view emphasizes security from 
seizure. Individuals underinvest if others may seize the fruits of their investments. Land 
titles can also encourage investment by improving the transferability of the parcels. Even 
if there were no risk of expropriation, investments in untitled parcels would be highly 
illiquid, whereas titling reduces the cost of alienation of the assets. A third mechanism is 
through the credit market. Transferability might allow the use of the land as collateral, 
diminishing the funding constraints on investment. Finally, a fourth link is that land titles 
provide poor households with a valuable savings tool. Poor households, especially in 
unstable macroeconomic environments, lack appropriate savings instruments. Land titles 
allow households to substitute present consumption and leisure into long-term savings in 
real property. We now investigate empirically the impact of legal land titles on housing 
investment. 
 
In Table 3 we summarize the analysis of the effect of property rights on housing 
investments. An important clarification is that before the occupation this was a wasteland 
area without any construction. Thus, the treatment and control areas had a similar (i.e., 
zero) baseline investment level before the occupation.21 In each column, we present the 
coefficient of the treatment dummy Property Right on a different housing characteristic. 
All the estimates reported in Table 3 are from regressions including controls for pre-
treatment characteristics of the parcel and the original squatter.  
 
The first two columns present large effects of land titling on the probability of having 
walls (first column) and roof (second column) of good quality. The proportion of houses 
with good quality walls rises by 40 percent under land titling, while the increase reaches 
47 percent for good quality roof. The third column presents the effect of land titling on 
the total surface constructed in the parcel. Our results suggest a statistically significant 
increase of about 12 percent in constructed surface under the presence of land titles. 
The fourth column shows a statistically significant increase of 16 percent in the 
proportion of houses with sidewalks made of concrete. In the last column, the variable 
                                                           
21
 In practice, it is not possible to identify one date of construction for these houses. Houses in 
this neighborhood are typically self-constructed through gradual incorporations (CEUR, 1984; 
Cespedes, 1984; Izaguirre and Aristizabal, 1988). 
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Overall Housing Appearance summarizes the overall aspect of each house using an 
index from 0 to 100 points assigned by the team of architects. The coefficient shows a 
large and significant effect of land titling on housing quality. Relative to the baseline 
average sample value, the estimated effect represents an overall housing improvement 
of 37 percent associated to titling. 
 
Table 3 - Housing Investment 
 Good 
Walls 
 
(1) 
 
Good Roof 
 
(2) 
Constructed 
Surface 
 
(3) 
Concrete 
Sidewalk 
 
(4) 
Overall 
Housing 
Appearance 
(5) 
Property Right 0.20*** 0.15** 8.27** 0.11** 8.42*** 
 (3.47) (2.49) (2.34) (2.18) (3.65) 
      
Control Group Mean 0.50 0.32 67.63 0.67 22.71 
%∆ 40.00% 46.87% 12.23% 16.42% 37.08% 
      
Notes: Good Walls, Good Roof, and Concrete Sidewalk are dummy variables that equal 1 if the house has 
walls of good quality, a roof of good quality, and a sidewalk made of concrete, respectively, and 0 
otherwise. Constructed surface is measured in squared meters. Overall Housing Appearance measures 
the overall aspect of each house from 0 to 100 points. The parcel is the unit of observation. All the 
regressions control for parcel and original squatter pre-treatment characteristics: parcel size; distance to 
creek; distance to nearest non-squatted area; block corner; age, gender, nationality, and years of 
education of the original squatter; and nationality and years of education of father and mother of the 
original squatter. Variables measured in 2003. The robustness of the results and detailed variable 
definitions are presented in Table 4 and Appendix Tables A.1 through A.4. Absolute values of t statistics 
are in parentheses. ** Significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
In Table 4, we show for the first investment variable (Good Walls) the robustness of the 
results regarding all the methodological concerns discussed in section IV. For the sake 
of space, the same analysis is relegated for the other investment variables to Appendix 
Tables A.1 to A.4, but the five tables should be taken into account for this robustness 
evaluation. In Table 4, column (1) repeats the model in the first column of Table 3, but 
displaying all the coefficients (and t-statistics) for the control variables. In column (2), we 
start with a simple model without including any control variables, while in column (3) we 
add back the control variables for the parcel characteristics. In these two alternative 
specifications, the point estimates on the variable of interest are very similar to those in 
column (1). In column (4) we add the observations for the San Martin neighborhood that 
were excluded from the baseline analysis in order to enhance geographical 
comparability between treatment and control groups (see Section III). The point estimate 
is smaller to that in the baseline model in column (1), but the difference is not statistically 
significant. 
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Table 4 – Robustness of Housing Investment Results: Good Walls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Property Right 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.20*** 0.20***  0.18***  0.21*** 0.11** 
 (3.47) (3.32) (3.37) (2.65) (3.18) (4.20)  (2.62)  (3.34) (2.35) 
Property Right Offer       0.16***     
       (2.59)     
Property Right 1989         0.23***   
         (2.77)   
Property Right 1998         0.19***   
         (2.90)   
Parcel Surface -0.00***  -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00***  -0.00** 
 (2.69)  (2.65) (2.19) (2.23) (4.15) (2.47) (2.74) (2.70)  (2.44) 
Distance to Creek 0.07**  0.07** 0.02 0.07** 0.07*** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07**  0.08*** 
 (2.31)  (2.29) (0.88) (2.47) (2.99) (2.26) (2.21) (2.11)  (3.27) 
Block Corner -0.06  -0.09 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06  -0.09 
 (0.66)  (1.15) (0.17) (0.68) (0.83) (0.45) (0.71) (0.67)  (1.28) 
Distance to Non-Squatted  0.03  0.04 0.05* 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03  0.02 
Area (0.97)  (1.49) (1.80) (0.84) (1.65) (0.91) (0.96) (0.97)  (0.89) 
Age of Original Squatter<50 0.01   -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01   
 (0.18)   (0.47) (0.18) (0.32) (0.03) (0.16) (0.16)   
Female Original Squatter 0.05   -0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05   
 (0.81)   (0.99) (0.82) (0.80) (0.83) (0.81) (0.81)   
Argentine Original Squatter -0.16   -0.12 -0.16 -0.16 -0.17 -0.17 -0.16   
 (1.12)   (0.95) (1.23) (1.24) (1.21) (1.16) (1.13)   
Years of Education of the  -0.02   -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02   
Original Squatter (1.03)   (0.60) (0.98) (1.37) (1.05) (1.02) (1.04)   
Argentine Father of the  -0.23**   -0.16 -0.23** -0.23*** -0.23** -0.23** -0.23**   
Original Squatter (2.03)   (1.52) (2.59) (3.53) (2.02) (1.99) (2.01)   
Years of Education of  0.02   -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02   
Original Squatter’s Father (0.60)   (0.35) (0.66) (0.78) (0.54) (0.55) (0.61)   
Argentine Mother of the  0.27**   0.15 0.27** 0.27 0.28** 0.27** 0.27**   
Original Squatter (2.38)   (1.42) (2.18) (1.49) (2.45) (2.41) (2.36)   
Years of Education of  0.00   0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
Original Squatter’s Mother (0.08)   (0.96) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07)   
Constant 0.71*** 0.50*** 0.58*** 0.66*** 0.71** 0.71*** 0.72*** 0.73*** 0.72***  0.57*** 
 (3.09) (11.92) (3.81) (3.54) (2.49) (4.54) (3.05) (3.18) (3.11)  (4.78) 
F-stat         0.16   
Observations 295 295 295 403 295 295 295 295 295 273 441 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the house has walls of good quality (brick, stone, block or concrete with exterior siding), 
and 0 otherwise. The parcel is the unit of observation. Column (1) is the one summarized in Column 1 of Table 3. Column (2) includes no controls, 
and Column (3) only controls for parcel characteristics. Column (4) adds the observations for the San Martin neighborhood. Standard errors clustered 
at the block level are used in Column (5), and at the former owner level in Column (6). The reduced-form regression on the intention-to-treat variable 
Property Right Offer is displayed in Column (7). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable Property Right with the intention-to-treat 
variable Property Right Offer) is presented in Column (8). Column (9) shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-stat tests the null 
hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. Column (10) presents the matching estimate using the propensity score of the probability of 
attrition (with bootstrapped standard errors). The regression in Column (11) is estimated on all the interviewed households (for any time of household 
arrival). The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 
.
 20 
 
In columns (5) and (6) we address the potential presence of error correlation by 
computing t-statistics using robust standard errors after clustering the parcels located in 
the same block and the parcels from the same former owner. The significance level of 
the variable of interest remains unaltered. For the other four investment variables, we 
also find that the significance levels of the Property Right variable remain basically 
unaltered when clustered standard errors are computed. 
 
Columns (7) and (8) deal with the potential problem of non-compliance. In column (7) we 
estimate the reduced-form parameter on the intention-to-treat Property Right Offer 
variable, while in column (8) we report the 2SLS estimates of instrumenting the Property 
Right variable with Property Right Offer. For the five investment variables, both 
estimates are very similar to those obtained from OLS in the baseline specification and 
the differences are not statistically significant at conventional levels, suggesting that non-
compliance is not an issue of concern in our sample.22 
 
In Columns (9) and (10) we address the concern that these results might be generated 
by attrition in the original squatter population and are not the cause of treatment. In 
Column (9) we separately report the effects for early and late land titling, exploiting the 
fact that, as shown in Table 2, the attrition rates of the late-treated and control groups 
are not significantly different. The results show that both the early and late treatments 
have positive significant effects on Good Walls and the other investment variables. For 
all the variables, the point estimates for the late treatment coefficient are very similar to 
the ones in the baseline specification in column (1). Moreover, the F-statistics show that 
we cannot reject the null hypotheses that the effects for the early-treated group and late-
treated group are similar at conventional levels of significance.23 Column (10) reports the 
matching estimates discussed in the previous section. Again, for Good Walls and the 
other investment variables, the point estimates are quite similar to those in the baseline 
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 The first-stage regression of Property Right on Property Right Offer is very strong. For the 
households that arrived before 1986 (i.e. the non-attrited group) and live in parcels offered for 
titling, the non-compliance rate is 11.2% (9.3% for the early treated, and 12% for the late treated).  
23
 If one was still to worry about the possibility that the former owners’ decisions of accepting or 
disputing the government offer was correlated with land or squatter characteristics, the 
significance of the late-treatment coefficients and their similarity with the early-treatment ones 
should be reassuring. In both the late-treated and control areas, the squatters settled on 
eventually contested tracts of land and are, therefore, homogenous regarding the decisions of 
their respective original owners (see section II). 
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specification and the differences are never statistically significant. Thus, the evidence 
suggests that the estimates in Table 3 identify the causal effect of land titling on 
investment and not a statistical artifact due to attrition.  
 
Finally, in column (11) we consider the whole sample of 448 parcels where households 
were interviewed, instead of considering only the parcels occupied by households that 
arrived before the time the former owners decided to surrender the land or sue. This 
analysis investigates a different parameter than the one considered so far. The 
estimated coefficient measures the causal effect of securing property rights on 
investment in a given parcel regardless of whether the family occupying it could have 
changed over time.24 The estimated coefficients for the different investment variables are 
sometimes smaller but, overall, of similar magnitude to those in the baseline models. 
 
A final question relates to the interpretation of the identified causal effect of land titling on 
investment. Is this an incentive effect induced by owning formal property rights, or is it 
mainly a wealth effect from titled households that became richer, housing being a normal 
good? The evidence suggests the treatment operates by affecting the incentives to 
invest. First, the size of the differential wealth transfer was moderate (see footnote 3) 
and seems considerably smaller than the value of the constructed dwellings.25 Second, 
the families could not have financed the investments with the wealth transfer. It would be 
impossible to sell the land and, at the same time, invest the collected money on it. 
Moreover, access to credit improved little with titling (see section V.4). Third, Appendix 
Table 5 shows no differences in the consumption of durable goods (refrigerators, 
freezers, washing machines, TV sets and cellular phones). This suggests that the large 
investment effects presented in this section are a result of a change in the relative 
returns to housing investment induced by the land titles, and not just a response to a 
wealth effect that should have also affected positively the consumption of these goods.26 
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 In these regressions that ignore household rotation, the estimated coefficient can be interpreted 
as “what grows in a parcel when it is entitled” regardless of whether the same family has always 
been occupying it or has been replaced by another one. Instead, the estimates obtained 
exclusively on the non-attrited households measure “what a given family builds in a parcel when 
receives a land title”. 
25
 For areas of this level of development in the Buenos Aires outskirts, Zavalia Lagos (2005) 
estimates that the values of the constructed houses exceed the parcel values by five times. 
26
 There are no differences in the access to public services. Basically all the households (titled 
and untitled) have connections to the water and electricity networks, whereas there are no 
sewage and natural gas networks in the area. 
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We conclude that moving a poor household from usufructuary rights to full property 
rights substantially improves housing quality. The estimated effects are large and robust, 
and seem to be the result of changes in the economic returns to housing investment 
induced by land titling. Thus, our micro evidence supports the hypothesis that securing 
property rights significantly increases investment levels.27 
 
V.2. Effects on Household Size 
 
The possession of land titles may also affect the size and structure of households. There 
are several potential reasons for that to happen. Insurance motives seem to be the most 
important. The poor lack access to well-functioning insurance markets and pension 
systems that could protect them during bad times and retirement. With limited access to 
risk diversification, to savings instruments, and to the social security system, the need for 
insurance has to be satisfied by other means. A traditional provider of insurance among 
the poor is the extended family. Another possibility is to use children as future insurance. 
In particular, old-age security motives can induce higher fertility (see, among others, 
Cain, 1985, Nugent, 1985, Ray, 1997, and Portner, 2001).28 By allowing the use of 
housing investment as a savings tool, by securing shelter for the old age, and by 
potentially improving credit access, land titling may provide some of the needed 
insurance, therefore reducing the demand for household members among the titled 
group.29 
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 A rough back-of-the-envelope calculation using our estimates gives that if the 15% of 
households in the Province of Buenos Aires who resided in an untitled dwelling (according to the 
1991 Census) would be titled, the increase in investment associated to this hypothetical exercise 
will amount to 1.2% of provincial GDP.    
28
 “[An] important question is whether having many children and/or a large extended household is 
an optimizing strategy allowing households to derive benefits otherwise lost due to poorly 
functioning markets” (Birdsall 1988, pp. 502).  
29
 David and Sundstrom (1984) explain the fertility changes in US history using a similar 
argument. Suppose, they argue, that large families were designed to be old-age insurance for the 
parents. At the time of independence, the superabundance of arable land meant that the price of 
land would not rise over time sufficiently to be a nest egg for old age, and children would be 
needed to care for their aged parents. When, late in the nineteenth century, the best lands were 
growing scarce, then the rent, and therefore the price, of land already owned and settled would 
increase becoming a nest egg due to its capital gain. Thus, investment in land operated as a 
substitute for more children. The scarcer the land, the higher the economic rent and capital gain, 
and the fewer children needed to provide for the declining years of the parents. 
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Moreover, the lack of land titles might reduce the ability of household heads to restrict 
their relatives from residing in their houses. The household heads may feel less powerful 
to expel or to deny access to members of their extended family when they lack formal 
titles. The lack of titles may also impede the division of wealth among family members, 
forcing claimants to live together to enjoy and retain usufructuary rights. For example, 
siblings (with their spouses and children) may end up having to live together if they 
cannot divide their inheritance upon the death of their untitled parents. In addition, 
untitled households may feel in need of increasing the number of family members in 
order to protect their houses from occupation by other squatters (Lanjouw and Levy, 
2002; Field, 2007). Through these concurrent mechanisms, the lack of formal land titles 
may generate, on average, larger households among the untitled group. 
 
In Table 5, we find large differences in household size between titled and untitled 
families. Untitled families have an average of 6.06 members, while titled households 
have 0.95 members less. Table 5 also shows that the difference in household size does 
not originate in a more frequent presence in the control group of a spouse of the 
household head (column 2), nor of offspring of the household head older than 13 years 
old, i.e. born before the first land titles were issued (column 3). This last result is 
important, because it suggests that there were no differences in the number of children 
of the household head born before treatment.30 
 
The difference in household size seems to originate in two factors. First, column (4) of 
Table 5 shows a higher presence (0.68 members) of non-nuclear relatives in untitled 
households. Untitled households report a much larger number of further relatives of the 
household head who are not her/his spouse or offspring (i.e., siblings, parents, in-laws, 
grandchildren, etc.) than entitled households.31 
 
 
 
                                                           
30
 The regression in column (3) only considers offspring living in the house. Non-significant 
differences are also obtained for the total number of household head’s offspring older than 13 
(i.e., living and not living in the parental home). 
31
 The hypothesis that extended family members are valuable to protect the house from other 
squatters would suggest a larger share of males among non-nuclear adult members in the control 
group than in the treatment group. In our dataset, however, the male proportion of non-nuclear 
adults is actually smaller in the control group. 
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Table 5 - Household Size 
 Number of 
Household 
Members 
(1) 
Household 
Head Spouse 
 
(2) 
Offspring of 
the HH (≥14 
years old) 
(3) 
Other Relatives 
(no Spouse or 
Offspring of HH) 
(4) 
Property Right -0.95*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.68*** 
 (2.81) (0.27) (0.06) (3.53) 
     
Control Group Mean 6.06 0.74 1.69 1.25 
%∆ Property Right -15.68% -1.35% -0.59% -54.40% 
 
 Offspring of the HH  
(5-13 years old) 
Offspring of the HH  
(0-4 years old) 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Property Right -0.17  -0.07  
 (1.18)  (1.03)  
Property Right 1989  -0.38*  -0.08 
  (1.88)  (0.81) 
Property Right 1998  -0.06  -0.07 
  (0.37)  (0.86) 
     
Control Group Mean 1.06 1.06 0.33 0.33 
%∆ Property Right -16.04%  -21.21%  
%∆ Property Right 1989  -35.85%  -24.24% 
%∆ Property Right 1998  -5.66%  -21.21% 
     
Notes: En each column, the dependent variable is the number of household members of each group. The 
household is the unit of observation. All the regressions control for parcel and original squatter pre-treatment 
characteristics: parcel size; distance to creek; distance to nearest non-squatted area; block corner; age, 
gender, nationality, and years of education of the original squatter; and nationality and years of education of 
father and mother of the original squatter. Variables measured in 2003. The robustness of the results and 
detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix Tables A.6 through A.11. Absolute values of t statistics 
are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Second, the entitled households show a smaller number of offspring of the household 
head born after the title allocation. To better analyze this result, we split the household 
heads’ offspring into those born between the first and the second title allocation (children 
between 5 and 13 years old), and those born after the second title allocation (children 
between 0 and 4 years old). For the 5-13 age group, column (6) of Table 5 shows a 
significant reduction of 36% in the number of household heads’ children for the early-
treated households. This decrease corresponds to 8.5% of the sample average of total 
household heads’ offspring.32 The effect, instead, is not significant for the late-treated 
                                                           
32
 This fertility effect does not depend on whether a woman or a man received the title. According 
to the expropriation law, the titles were awarded to both the household head and her/his spouse 
(if married or cohabitating). In our sample, 95.2 percent of the titled parcels include a woman as 
owner or co-owner. 
 25 
group. This result is reassuring, since treatment could not have affected fertility for the 
late-treated group in the 5-13 age bracket as these children were born before titling for 
this group. For the household heads’ children in the 0-4 age group, column (8) of Table 5 
shows that the effect, however, is not significant for both the late and early treated 
households. A plausible explanation for the lack of significant effects on the number of 
household heads’ offspring of 0-4 years of age is that by 2003 our household heads 
were fairly old and, therefore, their fertility rate is low.33 Still, in both cases the estimated 
coefficients correspond to a reduction in the number of offspring of more than 20%. 
 
The robustness of these results regarding the methodological concerns discussed in 
section IV is presented in Appendix Tables A.6 to A.11.34 Moreover, the results are 
robust to controlling for whether the original squatter is the current household head, for 
the age of the household head, and, in the regressions for the household heads’ children 
of 5-13 and 0-4 years of age, for the number of offspring of the household head 
previously born. In summary, we find that entitled households are smaller than untitled 
ones. The larger size of households in the untitled parcels is due to both a larger number 
of offspring of the household head and a more frequent presence of non-nuclear 
relatives. 
 
V.3. Effects on Educational Achievement 
 
The seminal work of Becker and Lewis (1973) advanced the presence of parental trade-
offs between the quantity and the quality of children. This trade-off appears because 
limited parents’ time and resources are spread over more children (see Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin (1980), Hanushek (1992), and Li et al. (2008) for empirical evidence). If land 
titling causes a reduction in fertility, it could also induce households to increase 
educational investments in their children. Moreover, land titling could also have 
beneficial effects on the education of household heads’ offspring through the reduction in 
                                                           
33
 Remember that 77% of them were already the heads of their households at the time of the 
occupation in 1981 (see footnote 11). In the 2003 survey, the average household head age was 
46 years old, and the average age of the female head (the household head if female or the age of 
his spouse if male) was 43.7 years old. 
34
 For those results that should only be present for the early-treated group, we cannot test the 
robustness of our results by contrasting the effects for the early and late groups. In these cases, 
we use only the matching estimates as robustness tests to address the attrition concern. 
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the number of extended family members living in the house and the potential health 
consequences of improved housing (Goux and Maurin, 2005). 
 
We explore this hypothesis by looking at differences in educational outcomes. In Table 6 
we first consider the School Achievement variable, which is the difference between the 
school grade the child is currently attending or the maximum grade attained (if she/he is 
not currently attending school) minus the grade corresponding to her/his age. This 
variable measures the performance of children from primary school on, collapsing 
differences in school dropout, grade repetition, and age of school initiation. We consider 
children from 6 years of age (the beginning of primary school) to 20 years of age at the 
time of the 2007 survey.35 For the offspring of the household head in the early-treated 
households (the households for which in column (6) of Table 5 we found a reduction in 
the number of members), column (2) of Table 6 shows a large effect on School 
Achievement. The children in the control group show an average delay of 1.95 years in 
their school achievement, whereas this delay is 0.69 years shorter for the children in the 
early-titled parcels. The effect is not significant for the children in the late-treated 
households, which had not shown a fertility reduction.36 
 
How large is this effect of land titling on school achievement? Consider, for example, the 
successful Mexican anti-poverty program Progresa, which provides monetary transfers 
to families that are contingent upon their children’s regular school attendance. The 
estimates in Behrman et al. (2005) indicate that if children were to participate in the 
program between their 6 to 14 years of age, they would experience an increase of 0.6 
years in average educational attainment levels, an effect comparable to the one we 
estimate for land titling in column (2) of Table 6. 
 
In columns (3) and (4), we compare differences in primary school completion. Primary 
school is mandatory in Argentina and compliance is high, particularly in urban areas. We 
find no differences in this variable. Children from both titled and untitled households 
                                                           
35
 Our approach is similar to the one used in the literature that uses twin births to study the effect 
of the number of children in the household on children education. The children born before 
“treatment” (i.e., before the n
th
 delivery for which some families in the sample have twins) are also 
included in the analysis. 
36
 The regressions in Table 6 are estimated at the child level and include controls for child age 
and gender. In addition to clustering the standard errors at the block and former owner levels, 
Appendix Tables A.12 through A.15 report standard errors clustered at the household level, 
together with the other robustness checks. 
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show primary school graduation rates above 80%. Thus, most of the difference in 
educational performance appears after primary school. 
 
Table 6 – Education 
Offspring of the Household Head 
 School Achievement 
(6-20 years old) 
Primary School Completion 
(13-20 years old) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Property Right 0.22  0.02  
 (1.15)  (0.45)  
Property Right 1989  0.69**  0.01 
  (2.29)  (0.12) 
Property Right 1998  0.03  0.02 
  (0.13)  (0.49) 
     
Control Group Mean -1.95 -1.95 0.82 0.82 
     
 
 Secondary School Completion 
(18-20 years old) 
Post-Secondary Education 
(18-20 years old) 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Property Right 0.06  0.11*  
 (0.72)  (1.91)  
Property Right 1989  0.27*  0.20** 
  (1.93)  (2.23) 
Property Right 1998  -0.01  0.07 
  (0.12)  (1.18) 
     
Control Group Mean 0.26 0.26 0.05 0.05 
     
Notes: In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the difference between the school grade each child 
is currently attending or the maximum grade attained (if not attending school) minus the grade 
corresponding to the child age. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if 
the child has finished primary school, and 0 otherwise. In columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is a 
dummy that equals 1 if the child has finished secondary school, and 0 otherwise. In columns (7) and (8), the 
dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the child has started post-secondary education (tertiary or 
university), and 0 otherwise. The child is the unit of observation. All the regressions control for child age, 
child gender, and parcel and original squatter pre-treatment characteristics (parcel size; distance to creek; 
distance to nearest non-squatted area; block corner; age, gender, nationality, and years of education of the 
original squatter; and nationality and years of education of original squatter’s parents). Education variables 
measured in 2007. The robustness of the results and detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix 
Tables A.12 through A.15. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%. 
 
Differences in educational achievement become significant for secondary and post-
secondary education. Column (6) of Table 6 shows that secondary school completion is 
27 points higher for the offspring of the household head in the early-treated households. 
Note that for secondary school completion, our regressions consider children between 
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18 (the expected age of secondary school graduation) and 20 years of age in 2007. In 
the early-titled parcels, these children were born just before treatment. Thus, the effect is 
only significant for the group of children who were raised in families with a small number 
of siblings thanks to, according to the estimates in the previous section, the reduction in 
fertility their parents experienced after titling. Similar results are presented in column (8), 
which shows that continuation into tertiary or university education is 20 points higher for 
children in the early-treated households, again the ones that showed the fertility 
reduction. 
 
Galiani (2010) estimates, using the international poverty line, that 26% of urban poor 
complete secondary school in Argentina, which is similar to the achievement of the 
control group. Among the non-poor, 63% complete secondary school (59% is the country 
urban average). Thus, our results suggest that the early-treated group has significantly 
reduced the gap between the poor and non-poor groups in the population. According to 
the 1991 Census, 15% of households in the Province of Buenos Aires resided in an 
untitled dwelling, which assuming they all belong to the bottom quintile of the family 
income per capita distribution, it implies that approximately 25% of the children currently 
starting primary school each year in Buenos Aires reside in untitled households. Thus, 
extrapolation of our results gives that titling the untitled population would imply that 
approximately 6.75% more of the population will finish high school (0.25%*27). This 
would represent an increase of 11.4% in the total secondary school completion rate.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that in a standard Mincer earnings equation using wage data 
from the official Argentine household survey (EPH, 2006), the returns to secondary 
school completion and incomplete tertiary education are estimated to be approximately 
20% and 40%, respectively, above those for incomplete secondary school. These large 
wage differentials augur significant long-term effects on the future labor market returns of 
the squatters’ offspring.  
 
V.4. Effects on Performance in the Credit and Labor Markets 
 
Financial markets in developing countries are highly imperfect and these imperfections 
are particularly severe for the poor. The possession of formal property rights could allow 
the use of land as collateral, improving the access of the poor to the credit markets 
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(Feder et al., 1988). In turn, this collateralized credit could be invested as capital, 
increasing labor productivity and income (De Soto, 2000). Moreover, land titling may 
have direct labor market effects if it relieves families from the need of leaving adults at 
home to protect their houses from occupation by other squatters (Field, 2007). We 
investigate whether land titles improve the performance of households in the credit and 
labor markets. 
 
Table 7 - Access to Credit 
 Credit Card 
& 
Bank Account 
(1) 
Non-Mortgage 
Loan 
Received 
(2) 
Informal 
Credit 
 
(3) 
Grocery Store 
Credit 
 
(4) 
Property Right -0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.01 
 (0.71) (0.19) (1.00) (0.16) 
     
Control Group Mean 0.05 0.09 0.41 0.27 
     
 
Mortgage Loan Received  
(5) (6) 
Property Right 0.02  
 (1.58)  
Property Right 1989  0.04*** 
  (3.19) 
Property Right 1998  0.00 
  (0.06) 
   
Control Group Mean 0.00 0.00 
   
Notes: Credit Card & Bank Account is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the household head has a credit 
card or bank account, and 0 otherwise. Non-Mortgage Loan Received, Informal Credit, Grocery Store 
Credit, and Mortgage Loan Received are dummy variables that equal 1 if the household has received 
formal non-mortgage credit; informal credit from relatives, colleagues, neighbors or friends; on trust credit 
from grocery stores; and formal mortgage credit; respectively, and 0 otherwise. The household is the unit 
of observation. All the regressions control for parcel and original squatter pre-treatment characteristics: 
parcel size; distance to creek; distance to nearest non-squatted area; block corner; age, gender, 
nationality, and years of education of the original squatter; and nationality and years of education of father 
and mother of the original squatter. Variables measured in 2003. The complete regressions and detailed 
variable definitions are presented in Appendix Table A.16. Absolute values of t statistics are in 
parentheses. *** Significant at 1%. 
 
In Table 7 we find no differences across groups in the access to credit cards and 
banking accounts; and to non-mortgage formal credit from banks, the government, labor 
unions or cooperatives. Indeed, these families show very little access to these types of 
formal credit. The access to credit is higher for informal credit from relatives, colleagues, 
neighbours, and friends, and for on-trust credit that families receive from the stores in 
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which they perform their daily purchases. However, titling status shows no effect on 
access to these informal sources of credit. 
 
In the second panel of Table 7 we analyze the impact of titling on the access to 
mortgage loans. For this exercise, we separate the effect for the early and late treatment 
households. The late treatment group was not yet in a legal situation to mortgage the 
land at the time of the survey, as the ten years established by the expropriation law 
before allowing property transfers had not elapsed since the 1998 titling (see section II). 
For the early titled group, although we find a statistically significant effect of land titling 
on the access to mortgage markets, the effect is quantitatively modest. Only 4% of the 
early-treated households have ever received a mortgage loan. 
 
Finally, we investigate the effect of land titling on labor market outcomes. For this 
exercise, a further advantage of our experiment is that treated and control households 
are all in the same labor market. In Table 8, we show no differences between control and 
treatment households in household head income, total household income, total 
household income per capita, total household income per adult, and employment status 
of the household head. There are also no significant differences in the pension status of 
the household heads, in female employment, and in child labor.37 In spite of land titling, 
these families are still very poor. Relative to the population of the Buenos Aires 
metropolitan area, the households in our sample show low income levels. Their average 
household income level is in the 25th centile of the income distribution in the official 
household survey (EPH, May 2003), while their average per capita income is in the 14th 
centile of the distribution. Moreover, their average household income amounts to only 
38% of the official poverty line, and 94% of the households are below this line.38 
 
 
                                                           
37
 In our population, the frequency of child labor (for children 10-14 years old) is 0% in the 
treatment group, and 1.05% in the control group (the difference is not significant). These figures 
coincide with the negligible levels of child labor for the Buenos Aires metropolitan area (0.18% for 
the overall and 0.29% for the first income quintile according to the official household survey of 
May 2003). They are also consistent with the high levels of primary school completion shown in 
section V.3. 
38
 The results on the effects of land titling on the credit and labor markets remain unaltered when 
we perform all our robustness checks. For the sake of space, Appendix Tables A.16 and A.17 
only include the main specification and the early-late regression. The other specifications are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 8 - Labor Market 
 Household 
Head 
Income 
 
(1) 
Total 
Household 
Income 
 
(2) 
Total 
Household 
Income 
per Capita 
(3) 
Total 
Household 
Income 
per Adult 
(4) 
Employed 
Household 
Head 
 
(5) 
Property Right -27.35 -43.56 1.04 -4.45 0.03 
 (1.10) (1.27) (0.13) (0.38) (0.63) 
      
Control Group Mean 272.54 374.59 73.72 118.73 0.73 
      
Notes: Household Head Income is the total income earned by the household head in the previous month. 
Total Household Income is the total income earned by all the household members in the previous month. 
Total Household Income per Capita is Total Household Income divided by the number of household 
members. Total Household Income per Adult is Total Household Income divided by the number of 
household members older than 16 years old. All income variables are measured in Argentine pesos. 
Employed Household Head is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the household head was employed the 
week before the survey, and 0 otherwise. The household is the unit of observation. All the regressions 
control for parcel and original squatter pre-treatment characteristics: parcel size; distance to creek; 
distance to nearest non-squatted area; block corner; age, gender, nationality, and years of education of 
the original squatter; and nationality and years of education of father and mother of the original squatter. 
Variables measured in 2003. The complete regressions are presented in Appendix Table A.17. Absolute 
values of t statistics are in parentheses. 
 
The modest effects of titling on the credit markets should not be too surprising. Previous 
evidence on the credit effects of land titling is ambiguous (see, among others, Feder et 
al., 1988; Place and Migot-Adholla, 1998; Carter and Olinto, 2002; Field and Torero, 
2003; and Calderon, 2004. Also see Woodruff, 2001, for a critical review of De Soto’s 
book). Real estate possession does not seem to be a sufficient condition to qualify for 
formal credit, which is largely restricted in Argentina to formal workers with requirements 
of minimum tenure in the current job and high wages. Moreover, potential lenders 
probably evaluate that success in the legal eviction of households in these 
socioeconomic groups in the event of default is unlikely (Arrunada, 2003) and, if feasible, 
the cost of the legal process may exceed the market value of the parcels. In addition, 
collateralization might have been further limited in our context by the ten-year transfer 
limitation. Finally, the few observed mortgage loans are probably not invested in 
business projects. The poor may consider the land too valuable to be jeopardized in an 
entrepreneurial activity. Thus, the modest credit effects do not further translate into labor 
market differences.39 
 
                                                           
39
 The coexistence of strong investment effects and weak credit market access in our natural 
experiment can be interpreted as an illustration of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)’s distinction 
between institutions that protect citizens against expropriation and institutions that enable private 
contracts. 
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VI. Conclusions 
 
Land-titling programs have been recently advocated in policy and business circles as a 
powerful anti-poverty instrument, and several countries in the developing world adopted 
or are in the process of adopting interventions to provide squatters with formal titles of 
the land they occupy. The main premise is that land titling could allow the poor to access 
the credit markets, transforming their wealth into capital and, hence, increase their labor 
productivity and income. Rigorous evidence supporting these hypothesized effects is, 
however, scarce and ambiguous. Are land-titling programs an effective tool to rapidly 
reduce poverty? What are the effects of land titling? 
 
Identifying the causal effects of land titling is difficult because the allocation of property 
rights across households is not random, but typically endogenous in equations 
describing the outcomes under study. Previous work exploited standard exclusion 
restrictions or variability in the timing of policy interventions to deal with this selection 
problem. In this paper, instead, we exploit a natural experiment in the allocation of land 
titles across squatters in a poor suburban area of Buenos Aires, Argentina. We believe 
that our strategy credibly identifies the effect of land titling: untitled and entitled 
households were extremely similar before titling, the parcels they inhabit are identical, 
and the allocation of property rights did not depend on the characteristics of the 
squatters. 
 
We only find a modest but positive effect of land titling on access to mortgage credit, and 
no impact on access to other forms of credit. Moreover, we do not find any effect on the 
labor income of the treated households. Should we therefore conclude that entitling the 
urban poor renders them little progress? Not necessarily. We showed that moving a poor 
household from usufructuary land rights to full property rights substantially increased 
investment in the houses. The constructed surface increases by 12%, while an overall 
index of housing quality rises by 37%. Moreover, households in the titled parcels have a 
smaller size (an average of 5.11 members relative to 6.06 in the untitled group), both 
through a reduced fertility of the household heads (when treated being young) and a 
diminished presence of extended family members. The families that reduced fertility also 
invested more in the education of their children allowing them to reach educational levels 
that can help them achieve significant long-term wage differentials. The children from the 
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households that reduced fertility show significantly better educational achievement, with 
an average of 0.69 more years of schooling and twice the completion rate of secondary 
education (53% vs. 26%). In sum, entitling the poor increases their investment both in 
the house and in the human capital of their children, which should contribute to reduce 
the poverty of the future generations. 
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Appendix Table A.1 - GOOD ROOF 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
0.15** 0.14** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15** 0.15**   0.16**   0.12* 0.12** Property Right 
(2.49) (2.41) (2.65) (2.67) (2.26) (2.68)  (2.22)  (1.66) (2.55) 
Property Right Offer       0.14**      
        (2.22)      
Property Right 1989         0.22***    
          (2.63)    
Property Right 1998         0.11*    
          (1.66)    
Parcel Surface 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
  (0.42)  (0.46) (1.45) (0.36) (0.24) (0.59) (0.43) (0.38)  (0.98) 
Distance to Creek 0.03  0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02  0.03 
  (0.94)  (1.00) (0.75) (0.84) (1.31) (1.03) (0.95) (0.55)  (1.07) 
Block Corner 0.08  0.08 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.08  0.02 
  (0.91)  (1.02) (1.60) (0.94) (0.68) (1.12) (0.91) (0.91)  (0.26) 
Distance to Non-Squatted -0.01  -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  -0.01 
Area (0.31)  (0.60) (0.56) (0.31) (0.54) (0.36) (0.31) (0.31)  (0.58) 
Age of Original  -0.01   0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01    
Squatter<50 (0.13)   (0.11) (0.14) (0.23) (0.25) (0.13) (0.20)    
Female Original Squatter -0.04   -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04    
  (0.64)   (0.73) (0.65) (1.20) (0.64) (0.64) (0.65)    
Argentine Original  0.18   0.13 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17    
Squatter (1.21)   (0.98) (1.13) (1.38) (1.16) (1.21) (1.15)    
Years of Education of the  0.00   0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    
Original Squatter (0.22)   (0.50) (0.21) (0.13) (0.19) (0.22) (0.19)    
Argentine Father of the  -0.02   0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01    
Original Squatter (0.15)   (0.47) (0.14) (0.21) (0.21) (0.16) (0.11)    
Years of Education of  -0.00   -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00    
Original Squatter’s Father (0.03)   (0.51) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.00)    
Argentine Mother of the  -0.09   -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09    
Original Squatter (0.73)   (1.02) (0.62) (0.62) (0.68) (0.74) (0.78)    
Years of Educ of Original  0.00   0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    
Squatter’s Mother (0.17)   (0.19) (0.18) (0.26) (0.14) (0.16) (0.14)    
Constant 0.12 0.32*** 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.16  0.22* 
  (0.52) (7.53) (1.41) (0.63) (0.50) (0.44) (0.45) (0.49) (0.69)  (1.85) 
F-stat         1.48    
Observations 297 297 297 405 297 297 297 297 297 276 445 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the house has a roof of good quality (asphalt shingle, membrane, tile, slab, slate or clay roof tile), and 0 otherwise. The 
parcel is the unit of observation. Column (1) is summarized in Column 2 of Table 3. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls for parcel characteristics. Column 
(4) adds the observations for the San Martin neighborhood. Standard errors clustered at the block level are used in Column (5), and at the former owner level in Column (6). The 
reduced-form regression on the intention-to-treat variable Property Right Offer is displayed in Column (7). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable Property Right 
with the intention-to-treat variable Property Right Offer) is presented in Column (8). Column (9) shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-stat tests the null 
hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. Column (10) presents the matching estimate using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (with bootstrapped 
standard errors). The regression in Column (11) is estimated on all the interviewed households (for any time of household arrival). Parcel Surface is measured in squared meters. 
Distance to Creek and Distance to Non-Squatted Area are measured in blocks. For deceased original squatters, the age was calculated from year of death and age at death. We 
use (non-reported) dummies for missing data on original squatter’s age, and original squatter parents’ nationality and years of education (a total of ten observations). Absolute value 
of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix Table A.2 – CONSTRUCTED SURFACE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Property Right 8.27** 7.99** 9.89*** 5.30* 8.27** 8.27   9.87**   8.55** 8.61*** 
  (2.34) (2.33) (2.87) (1.68) (2.15) (1.44)  (2.41)  (2.18) (3.02) 
Property Right Offer       9.06**      
        (2.41)      
Property Right 1989         10.34**    
          (2.09)    
Property Right 1998         7.18*    
          (1.80)    
Parcel Surface -0.01  -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01  0.01 
  (0.36)  (0.02) (0.63) (0.37) (0.35) (0.12) (0.31) (0.37)  (0.68) 
Distance to Creek 5.90***  6.42*** 2.63** 5.90*** 5.90*** 6.25*** 6.07*** 5.54***  4.80*** 
  (3.03)  (3.42) (2.09) (3.11) (3.06) (3.17) (3.10) (2.73)  (3.15) 
Block Corner 4.38  3.98 3.03 4.38 4.38 5.78 4.57 4.39  8.37** 
  (0.87)  (0.82) (0.67) (0.77) (1.59) (1.13) (0.91) (0.87)  (2.10) 
Distance to Non-Squatted  3.67**  4.51*** 3.05* 3.67 3.67 3.58** 3.69** 3.67**  2.02 
Area (2.06)  (2.60) (1.93) (1.60) (1.43) (2.01) (2.07) (2.06)  (1.36) 
Age of Original  -1.68   -2.63 -1.68 -1.68 -2.02 -1.59 -1.80    
Squatter<50 (0.48)   (0.88) (0.51) (0.51) (0.58) (0.45) (0.51)    
Female Original Squatter -0.70   -1.99 -0.70 -0.70 -0.67 -0.69 -0.73    
  (0.20)   (0.66) (0.21) (0.23) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20)    
Argentine Original  -7.54   -8.07 -7.54 -7.54 -7.62 -7.18 -7.76    
Squatter (0.87)   (1.07) (0.85) (1.48) (0.88) (0.83) (0.90)    
Years of Education of the  -0.08   -0.14 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09    
Original Squatter (0.08)   (0.17) (0.08) (0.06) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09)    
Argentine Father of the  -5.45   -2.43 -5.45 -5.45 -6.05 -5.68 -5.28    
Original Squatter (0.79)   (0.39) (0.83) (1.14) (0.88) (0.83) (0.77)    
Years of Education of  -3.31**   -3.22** -3.31** -3.31* -3.29** -3.24** -3.29**    
Original Squatter’s Father (2.06)   (2.38) (2.21) (1.89) (2.05) (2.01) (2.04)    
Argentine Mother of the  10.73   8.19 10.73 10.73*** 10.92 10.54 10.51    
Original Squatter (1.55)   (1.28) (1.27) (3.04) (1.58) (1.53) (1.52)    
Years of Educ of Original  3.59**   3.58** 3.59* 3.59* 3.50** 3.54** 3.57**    
Squatter’s Mother (2.10)   (2.28) (1.68) (1.78) (2.04) (2.06) (2.08)    
Constant 54.32*** 67.63*** 46.28*** 58.62*** 54.32*** 54.32*** 52.19*** 52.66*** 55.53***  49.97*** 
  (3.98) (26.49) (5.00) (5.32) (3.39) (4.32) (3.77) (3.81) (4.02)  (6.78) 
F-stat         0.36    
Observations 299 299 299 407 299 299 299 299 299 277 447 
Notes: The dependent variable is the constructed surface in squared meters. The parcel is the unit of observation. Column (1) is summarized in Column 3 of Table 3. Column (2) 
includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls for parcel characteristics. Column (4) adds the observations for the San Martin neighborhood. Standard errors clustered at the 
block level are used in Column (5), and at the former owner level in Column (6). The reduced-form regression on the intention-to-treat variable Property Right Offer is displayed in 
Column (7). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable Property Right with the intention-to-treat variable Property Right Offer) is presented in Column (8). Column 
(9) shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. Column (10) presents the matching 
estimate using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (with bootstrapped standard errors). The regression in Column (11) is estimated on all the interviewed households 
(for any time of household arrival). The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix Table A.3 - CONCRETE SIDEWALK 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Property Right 0.11** 0.08 0.12** 0.10** 0.11 0.11   0.10   0.08 0.16*** 
  (2.18) (1.43) (2.24) (2.41) (1.60) (1.55)   (1.63)   (1.42) (3.85) 
Property Right Offer       0.09      
        (1.62)      
Property Right 1989         0.16**    
          (2.14)    
Property Right 1998         0.09    
          (1.55)    
Parcel Surface -0.00  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00  -0.00 
  (0.44)  (0.69) (0.51) (0.40) (0.24) (0.33) (0.47) (0.46)  (1.15) 
Distance to Creek 0.09***  0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***  0.11*** 
  (3.29)  (3.19) (4.64) (2.40) (2.25) (3.25) (3.22) (2.90)  (4.89) 
Block Corner -0.12  -0.14** -0.13** -0.12 -0.12* -0.11 -0.12 -0.12  -0.08 
  (1.57)  (1.98) (2.17) (1.65) (2.01) (1.38) (1.59) (1.57)  (1.29) 
Distance to Non-Squatted  -0.07**  -0.07*** -0.05** -0.07* -0.07 -0.07** -0.07** -0.07**  -0.09*** 
Area (2.49)  (2.66) (2.27) (1.68) (1.69) (2.50) (2.49) (2.49)  (4.14) 
Age of Original  -0.10*   -0.07* -0.10** -0.10* -0.11** -0.10* -0.10*    
Squatter<50 (1.92)   (1.78) (2.03) (2.09) (2.02) (1.94) (1.97)    
Female Original Squatter -0.05   -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05    
  (0.95)   (1.54) (0.90) (1.45) (0.95) (0.96) (0.97)    
Argentine Original  0.06   0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06    
Squatter (0.50)   (0.47) (0.41) (0.74) (0.45) (0.48) (0.47)    
Years of Education of the  -0.02   -0.02 -0.02* -0.02** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02    
Original Squatter (1.44)   (1.50) (1.81) (2.75) (1.45) (1.43) (1.46)    
Argentine Father of the  -0.03   -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03    
Original Squatter (0.34)   (0.19) (0.40) (0.32) (0.36) (0.32) (0.30)    
Years of Education of  0.03   0.03 0.03 0.03* 0.03 0.03 0.03    
Original Squatter’s Father (1.37)   (1.48) (1.55) (1.74) (1.33) (1.34) (1.39)    
Argentine Mother of the  -0.02   -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03    
Original Squatter (0.21)   (0.34) (0.15) (0.23) (0.16) (0.19) (0.25)    
Years of Educ of Original  -0.03   -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03    
Squatter’s Mother (1.15)   (1.35) (1.11) (0.99) (1.17) (1.14) (1.17)    
Constant 0.84*** 0.67*** 0.71*** 0.81*** 0.84*** 0.84** 0.84*** 0.85*** 0.86***  0.68*** 
  (4.10) (17.19) (5.17) (5.54) (3.27) (2.26) (4.06) (4.13) (4.18)  (6.34) 
F-stat         0.71    
Observations 300 300 300 408 300 300 300 300 300 278 448 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the house has a sidewalk made of concrete, and 0 otherwise. The parcel is the unit of observation. Column (1) is 
summarized in Column 4 of Table 3. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls for parcel characteristics. Column (4) adds the observations for the San Martin 
neighborhood. Standard errors clustered at the block level are used in Column (5), and at the former owner level in Column (6). The reduced-form regression on the intention-to-
treat variable Property Right Offer is displayed in Column (7). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable Property Right with the intention-to-treat variable Property 
Right Offer) is presented in Column (8). Column (9) shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property 
Right 1998. Column (10) presents the matching estimate using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (with bootstrapped standard errors). The regression in Column (11) 
is estimated on all the interviewed households (for any time of household arrival). The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in 
parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix Table A.4 – OVERALL HOUSING APPEARANCE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Property Right 8.42*** 7.45*** 8.07*** 5.39*** 8.42*** 8.42***   10.17***   8.23*** 6.97*** 
  (3.65) (3.38) (3.58) (2.67) (3.91) (2.98)  (3.80)  (3.63) (3.87) 
Property Right Offer       9.34***      
        (3.81)      
Property Right 1989         6.27*    
          (1.95)    
Property Right 1998         9.54***    
          (3.68)    
Parcel Surface -0.02  -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02* -0.01 -0.02 -0.02  -0.02* 
  (1.28)  (1.46) (0.47) (1.49) (2.00) (0.89) (1.19) (1.25)  (1.87) 
Distance to Creek 2.47*  2.32* -0.26 2.47* 2.47** 2.84** 2.66** 2.83**  3.01*** 
  (1.95)  (1.90) (0.32) (1.85) (2.88) (2.21) (2.08) (2.14)  (3.13) 
Block Corner 0.13  -0.70 1.94 0.13 0.13 1.59 0.34 0.13  0.02 
  (0.04)  (0.22) (0.68) (0.04) (0.03) (0.48) (0.10) (0.04)  (0.01) 
Distance to Non-Squatted  -0.00  -0.14 -0.19 -0.00 -0.00 -0.09 0.02 -0.01  -0.49 
Area (0.00)  (0.13) (0.18) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.52) 
Age of Original  0.61   0.12 0.61 0.61 0.26 0.71 0.73    
Squatter<50 (0.26)   (0.06) (0.31) (0.43) (0.11) (0.31) (0.32)    
Female Original Squatter -3.21   -3.98** -3.21 -3.21 -3.18 -3.20 -3.18    
  (1.39)   (2.08) (1.46) (1.71) (1.38) (1.38) (1.37)    
Argentine Original  6.82   2.65 6.82 6.82** 6.77 7.22 7.04    
Squatter (1.21)   (0.55) (0.95) (2.33) (1.20) (1.28) (1.25)    
Years of Education of the  0.70   0.48 0.70 0.70 0.66 0.69 0.72    
Original Squatter (1.08)   (0.93) (0.88) (0.73) (1.02) (1.06) (1.11)    
Argentine Father of the  -9.82**   -5.85 -9.82** -9.82** -10.46** -10.07** -9.99**    
Original Squatter (2.19)   (1.45) (2.20) (2.40) (2.34) (2.25) (2.23)    
Years of Education of  -1.13   -0.65 -1.13 -1.13** -1.10 -1.05 -1.16    
Original Squatter’s Father (1.08)   (0.75) (1.37) (2.17) (1.05) (1.00) (1.10)    
Argentine Mother of the  -1.94   -1.18 -1.94 -1.94 -1.75 -2.14 -1.71    
Original Squatter (0.43)   (0.29) (0.33) (0.45) (0.39 (0.47) (0.38)    
Years of Educ of Original  -1.22   -0.81 -1.22 -1.22 -1.32 -1.28 -1.19    
Squatter’s Mother (1.09)   (0.81) (1.00) (0.97) (1.18) (1.14) (1.07)    
Constant 34.15*** 22.71*** 24.63*** 33.20*** 34.15*** 34.15*** 31.85*** 32.33*** 32.89***  24.73*** 
  (3.84) (13.82) (4.08) (4.72) (3.71) (3.89) (3.53) (3.58) (3.66)  (5.31) 
F-stat         0.91    
Observations 299 299 299 407 299 299 299 299 299 277 446 
Notes: The dependent variable measures the overall aspect of each house from 0 to 100 points assigned by the team of architects assuming 0 for the worst dwelling in a shanty 
town of Solano and 100 for a middle-class house in downtown Quilmes (the main locality of the county). Similar results are obtained using an alternative index that measures the 
overall aspect of each house from 0 to 100 points assuming 0 for the worst and 100 for the best houses within this neighborhood. The parcel is the unit of observation. Column (1) is 
summarized in Column 5 of Table 3. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls for parcel characteristics. Column (4) adds the observations for the San Martin 
neighborhood. Standard errors clustered at the block level are used in Column (5), and at the former owner level in Column (6). The reduced-form regression on the intention-to-
treat variable Property Right Offer is displayed in Column (7). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable Property Right with the intention-to-treat variable Property 
Right Offer) is presented in Column (8). Column (9) shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property 
Right 1998. Column (10) presents the matching estimate using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (with bootstrapped standard errors). The regression in Column (11) 
is estimated on all the interviewed households (for any time of household arrival). The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in 
parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix Table A.5 - DURABLE CONSUMPTION 
Refrigerator 
with 
Freezer 
Refrigerator 
without 
Freezer 
Washing 
Machine 
TV 
Cellular 
Phone 
  
                  
(1) 
                  
(2) 
                  
(3) 
                  
(4) 
                  
(5) 
Property Right 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.92) (0.61) (0.67) (0.40) (0.32) 
Parcel Surface -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
  (1.28) (0.82) (0.39) (0.44) (0.98) 
Distance to Creek 0.09*** -0.03 0.06** 0.06*** 0.03* 
  (2.98) (0.83) (2.11) (3.12) (1.88) 
Block Corner -0.04 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.02 
  (0.47) (1.05) (0.56) (0.67) (0.57) 
Distance to Non-Squatted Area -0.01 0.02 0.06** 0.02 0.00 
  (0.28) (0.80) (2.04) (0.95) (0.31) 
Age of Original Squatter<50 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 
  (0.58) (0.20) (0.32) (0.38) (0.32) 
Female Original Squatter 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.00 
  (0.35) (0.74) (0.86) (1.04) (0.20) 
Argentine Original Squatter 0.05 -0.06 -0.02 -0.22*** -0.01 
  (0.37) (0.37) (0.14) (2.67) (0.22) 
Years of Education of the  0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.00 
Original Squatter (1.02) (1.29) (1.30) (1.55) (0.64) 
Argentine Father of the  -0.10 0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.04 
Original Squatter (0.87) (0.43) (0.39) (0.90) (0.90) 
Years of Education of  0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.02* 
Original Squatter’s Father (0.21) (0.18) (0.54) (0.14) (1.91) 
Argentine Mother of the  -0.03 0.06 -0.07 0.08 -0.02 
Original Squatter (0.30) (0.50) (0.62) (1.18) (0.49) 
Years of Education of  0.01 -0.01 -0.05* -0.01 -0.02** 
Original Squatter’s Mother (0.35) (0.38) (1.77) (0.82) (2.06) 
Constant 0.19 0.55** 0.66*** 0.85*** -0.01 
  (0.86) (2.33) (3.02) (6.64) (0.12) 
Observations 311 311 311 312 312 
Notes: The dependent variable of each column is a dummy that equals 1 if the household possesses the 
good, and 0 otherwise. The household is the unit of observation. The control variables are described in 
Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 42 
Appendix Table A.6 – NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Property Right -0.95*** -0.87*** -0.86** -0.92*** -0.95** -0.95**   -1.19***   -0.87** 
  (2.81) (2.66) (2.55) (3.06) (2.55) (2.76)  (3.02)  (2.33) 
Property Right Offer        -1.10***     
         (3.03)     
Property Right 1989          -1.18**   
           (2.50)   
Property Right 1998          -0.82**   
           (2.16)   
Parcel Surface 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
  (0.58)  (0.68) (0.86) (0.61) (1.12) (0.22) (0.51) (0.60)   
Distance to Creek 0.03  -0.04 0.08 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.07   
  (0.19)  (0.20) (0.66) (0.19) (0.21) (0.12) (0.05) (0.39)   
Block Corner -0.05  0.05 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.25 -0.07 -0.05   
  (0.10)  (0.10) (0.06) (0.11) (0.12) (0.51) (0.15) (0.10)   
Distance to Non-Squatted  0.03  -0.02 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03   
Area (0.17)  (0.11) (0.64) (0.17) (0.19) (0.21) (0.16) (0.17)   
Age of Original  1.04***   0.77*** 1.04*** 1.04*** 1.08*** 1.02*** 1.05***   
Squatter<50 (3.08)   (2.70) (3.04) (3.86) (3.20) (3.02) (3.11)   
Female Original Squatter -0.09   -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.75 -0.09 -0.08   
  (0.25)   (0.32) (0.24) (0.18) (0.22) (0.27) (0.25)   
Argentine Original  -0.90   -0.69 -0.90 -0.90 -0.92 -0.96 -0.87   
Squatter (1.07)   (0.95) (1.15) (1.16) (1.10) (1.14) (1.04)   
Years of Education of the  -0.08   -0.11 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07   
Original Squatter (0.79)   (1.49) (0.78) (0.54) (0.74) (0.77) (0.76)   
Argentine Father of the  1.24*   1.09* 1.24* 1.24* 1.33** 1.27* 1.22*   
Original Squatter (1.85)   (1.77) (1.78) (1.92) (1.98) (1.89) (1.82)   
Years of Education of  -0.18   -0.17 -0.18 -0.18 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18   
Original Squatter’s Father (1.15)   (1.35) (1.23) (1.30) (1.21) (1.21) (1.16)   
Argentine Mother of the  -0.75   -0.59 -0.75 -0.75 -0.76 -0.73 -0.73   
Original Squatter (1.11)   (0.95) (1.06) (1.48) (1.13) (1.08) (1.07)   
Years of Educ of Original 0.07   0.04 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07   
Squatter’s Mother (0.43)   (0.29) (0.48) (0.46) (0.53) (0.47) (0.45)   
Constant 6.41*** 6.06*** 5.72*** 6.52*** 6.41*** 6.41*** 6.77*** 6.67*** 6.26***   
  (4.89) (24.97) (6.34) (6.17) (5.51) (6.74) (5.07) (5.02) (4.71)   
F-stat          0.51   
Observations 313 313 313 425 313 313 313 313 313 290 
Notes: The dependent variable is the total number of household members. The household is the unit of observation. Column (1) is summarized in Column 1 of Table 
5. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls for parcel characteristics. Column (4) adds the observations for the San Martin neighborhood. 
Standard errors clustered at the block level are used in Column (5), and at the former owner level in Column (6). The reduced-form regression on the intention-to-treat 
variable Property Right Offer is displayed in Column (7). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable Property Right with the intention-to-treat variable 
Property Right Offer) is presented in Column (8). Column (9) shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis: Property 
Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. Column (10) presents the matching estimate using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (with bootstrapped standard 
errors). The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. 
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Appendix Table A.7 – HOUSEHOLD HEAD SPOUSE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Property Right -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01   0.01   -0.05 
  (0.27) (0.37) (0.37) (0.56) (0.26) (0.41)  (0.20)  (0.70) 
Property Right Offer       0.01     
        (0.20)     
Property Right 1989         -0.03   
          (0.36)   
Property Right 1998         -0.01   
          (0.13)   
Parcel Surface -0.00  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00   
  (0.94)  (1.45) (0.86) (0.98) (1.53) (0.86) (0.89) (0.93)   
Distance to Creek 0.02  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02   
  (0.67)  (0.47) (0.73) (0.70) (0.58) (0.75) (0.75) (0.70)   
Block Corner 0.03  0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03   
  (0.41)  (0.84) (0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.41)   
Distance to Non-Squatted 0.01  0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01   
Area (0.37)  (0.03) (1.22) (0.36) (0.39) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37)   
Age of Original  0.03   0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03   
Squatter<50 (0.56)   (1.02) (0.47) (0.57) (0.58) (0.59) (0.57)   
Female Original Squatter -0.28***   -0.31*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28***   
  (5.41)   (7.20) (4.82) (4.66) (5.40) (5.39) (5.40)   
Argentine Original  -0.01   0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00   
Squatter (0.05)   (0.14) (0.05) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04)   
Years of Education of the  0.02*   0.01 0.02* 0.02** 0.02* 0.02* 0.02*   
Original Squatter (1.71)   (1.02) (1.77) (2.22) (1.70) (1.71) (1.72)   
Argentine Father of the  -0.05   -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05   
Original Squatter (0.45)   (0.24) (0.55) (0.77) (0.48) (0.48) (0.45)   
Years of Education of  0.00   0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
Original Squatter’s Father (0.03)   (0.85) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.02)   
Argentine Mother of the  -0.06   -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06   
Original Squatter (0.58)   (0.93) (0.63) (0.53) (0.60) (0.60) (0.56)   
Years of Educ of Original  -0.02   0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02   
Squatter’s Mother (0.81)   (0.12) (0.64) (0.85) (0.84) (0.83) (0.80)   
Constant 0.89*** 0.74*** 0.84*** 0.73*** 0.89*** 0.89*** 0.86*** 0.86*** 0.88***   
  (4.46) (19.44) (6.01) (4.59) (5.25) (9.38) (4.23) (4.27) (4.36)   
F-stat         0.06   
Observations 313 313 313 425 313 313 313 313 313 290 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the household head lives with a spouse, and 0 otherwise. The household is the unit of observation. Column 
(1) is summarized in Column 2 of Table 5. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls for parcel characteristics. Column (4) adds the observations 
for the San Martin neighborhood. Standard errors clustered at the block level are used in Column (5), and at the former owner level in Column (6). The reduced-form 
regression on the intention-to-treat variable Property Right Offer is displayed in Column (7). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable Property Right 
with the intention-to-treat variable Property Right Offer) is presented in Column (8). Column (9) shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-stat 
tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. Column (10) presents the matching estimate using the propensity score of the probability of 
attrition (with bootstrapped standard errors). The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix Table A.8 – NUMBER OF OFFSPRING OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD ≥ 14 YEARS OLD 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Property Right -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01  -0.18  0.05 
  (0.06) (0.15) (0.06) (0.37) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.84)  (0.26) 
Property Right Offer       -0.17     
        (0.85)     
Property Right 1989         -0.34   
          (1.29)   
Property Right 1998         0.16   
          (0.77)   
Parcel Surface 0.00  0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
  (1.00)  (1.12) (1.92) (0.96) (1.55) (0.82) (0.91) (1.05)   
Distance to Creek 0.10  0.08 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.15   
  (0.95)  (0.81) (0.43) (0.89) (1.26) (0.71) (0.77) (1.43)   
Block Corner -0.06  -0.01 0.14 -0.06 -0.06 -0.11 -0.08 -0.06   
  (0.23)  (0.02) (0.58) (0.25) (0.40) (0.39) (0.30) (0.24)   
Distance to Non-Squatted 0.08  0.06 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08   
Area (0.88)  (0.71) (0.53) (0.89) (1.33) (0.89) (0.87) (0.88)   
Age of Original  0.27   0.24 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.29   
Squatter<50 (1.47)   (1.53) (1.59) (1.61) (1.46) (1.41) (1.57)   
Female Original Squatter -0.02   -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02   
  (0.10)   (0.73) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09)   
Argentine Original  -0.16   -0.10 -0.16 -0.16 -0.19 -0.20 -0.12   
Squatter (0.34)   (0.25) (0.38) (0.32) (0.42) (0.43) (0.26)   
Years of Education of the  0.00   -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
Original Squatter (0.04)   (0.30) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09)   
Argentine Father of the  0.49   0.30 0.49* 0.49** 0.52 0.51 0.47   
Original Squatter (1.33)   (0.89) (1.71) (2.22) (1.41) (1.39) (1.27)   
Years of Education of  0.01   0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01   
Original Squatter’s Father (0.14)   (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.11)   
Argentine Mother of the  -0.12   0.07 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.08   
Original Squatter (0.31)   (0.21) (0.34) (0.23) (0.28) (0.27) (0.22)   
Years of Educ of Original 0.04   0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05   
Squatter’s Mother (0.47)   (0.25) (0.48) (0.62) (0.54) (0.52) (0.53)   
Constant 0.48 1.69*** 1.03** 0.76 0.48 0.48 0.67 0.65 0.27   
  (0.66) (12.83) (2.11) (1.31) (0.74) (0.69) (0.91) (0.89) (0.36)   
F-stat         3.16*   
Observations 313 313 313 425 313 313 313 313 313 290 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of sons or daughters of the household head older than 13 years old living in the house. The household is the unit of 
observation. Column (1) is summarized in Column 3 of Table 5. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls for parcel characteristics. Column (4) 
adds the observations for the San Martin neighborhood. Standard errors clustered at the block level are used in Column (5), and at the former owner level in Column 
(6). The reduced-form regression on the intention-to-treat variable Property Right Offer is displayed in Column (7). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment 
variable Property Right with the intention-to-treat variable Property Right Offer) is presented in Column (8). Column (9) shows separately the effect of early and late 
treatments. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. Column (10) presents the matching estimate using the propensity score of 
the probability of attrition (with bootstrapped standard errors). The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix Table A.9 – NUMBER OF OTHER RELATIVES (NO SPOUSE OR OFFSPRING OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Property Right -0.68*** -0.53*** -0.55*** -0.56*** -0.68*** -0.68***   -0.90***   -0.70** 
  (3.53) (2.75) (2.75) (3.23) (3.51) (4.97)  (3.97)  (2.37) 
Property Right Offer       -0.82***     
        (4.00)     
Property Right 1989         -0.36   
          (1.36)   
Property Right 1998         -0.85***   
          (3.92)   
Parcel Surface -0.00  0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00   
  (0.08)  (0.02) (0.04) (0.10) (0.21) (0.56) (0.19) (0.13)   
Distance to Creek -0.08  -0.09 -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 -0.10 -0.13   
  (0.76)  (0.85) (0.32) (0.73) (1.09) (1.18) (0.96) (1.22)   
Block Corner 0.03  0.00 -0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.13 0.00 0.03   
  (0.10)  (0.01) (0.26) (0.12) (0.16) (0.46) (0.01) (0.11)   
Distance to Non-Squatted -0.12  -0.12 -0.07 -0.12 -0.12** -0.11 -0.12 -0.12   
Area (1.23)  (1.18) (0.86) (1.32) (2.17) (1.18) (1.23) (1.22)   
Age of Original  -0.35*   -0.43*** -0.35* -0.35* -0.32* -0.36* -0.36*   
Squatter<50 (1.80)   (2.59) (1.94) (2.07) (1.68) (1.87) (1.89)   
Female Original Squatter 0.32*   0.26 0.32* 0.32 0.33* 0.32 0.32*   
  (1.66)   (1.56) (1.77) (1.56) (1.71) (1.63) (1.65)   
Argentine Original  -0.71   -0.53 -0.71 -0.71 -0.73 -0.76 -0.75   
Squatter (1.49)   (1.26) (1.48) (1.36) (1.54) (1.59) (1.57)   
Years of Education of the  -0.10*   -0.09** -0.10** -0.10 -0.09* -0.10* -0.10*   
Original Squatter (1.78)   (2.09) (2.08) (1.66) (1.72) (1.76) (1.84)   
Argentine Father of the  0.97**   0.86** 0.97* 0.97* 1.05*** 1.00*** 1.00***   
Original Squatter (2.54)   (2.43) (1.91) (1.84) (2.74) (2.61) (2.61)   
Years of Education of  -0.06   -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05   
Original Squatter’s Father (0.65)   (0.93) (0.51) (0.62) (0.74) (0.75) (0.63)   
Argentine Mother of the  -0.37   -0.31 -0.37 -0.37 -0.37 -0.35 -0.40   
Original Squatter (0.96)   (0.88) (0.84) (1.06) (0.98) (0.91) (1.05)   
Years of Educ of Original  0.03   -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02   
Squatter’s Mother (0.30)   (0.24) (0.29) (0.34) (0.45) (0.37) (0.25)   
Constant 2.56*** 1.25*** 1.63*** 2.55*** 2.56*** 2.56*** 2.87*** 2.79*** 2.77***   
  (3.42) (8.66) (3.05) (4.21) (3.73) (5.05) (3.77) (3.66) (3.66)   
F-stat         2.81*   
Observations 313 313 313 425 313 313 313 313 313 290 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of household members excluding the household head, household head spouse and sons or daughters of the household 
head. The household is the unit of observation. Column (1) is summarized in Column 4 of Table 5. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls for 
parcel characteristics. Column (4) adds the observations for the San Martin neighborhood. Standard errors clustered at the block level are used in Column (5), and at 
the former owner level in Column (6). The reduced-form regression on the intention-to-treat variable Property Right Offer is displayed in Column (7). The 2SLS 
regression (instrumenting the treatment variable Property Right with the intention-to-treat variable Property Right Offer) is presented in Column (8). Column (9) shows 
separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. Column (10) presents the matching 
estimate using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (with bootstrapped standard errors). The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix Table A.10 – NUMBER OF OFFSPRING OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 5-13 YEARS OLD 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Property Right -0.17 -0.22 -0.23 -0.21* -0.17 -0.17  -0.12  -0.12    
  (1.18) (1.51) (1.56) (1.66) (1.23) (0.99)  (0.72)  (0.75)    
Property Right Offer       -0.11       
        (0.72)       
Property Right 1989         -0.38*  -0.38*   
          (1.88)  (1.77)   
Property Right 1998         -0.06   -0.08 
          (0.37)   (0.46) 
Parcel Surface 0.00  0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
  (0.14)  (0.24) (0.21) (0.14) (0.14) (0.10) (0.17) (0.18)     
Distance to Creek 0.01  -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04     
  (0.10)  (0.49) (0.86) (0.11) (0.16) (0.12) (0.16) (0.53)     
Block Corner -0.01  -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01     
  (0.06)  (0.07) (0.39) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.03) (0.06)     
Distance to Non-Squatted  0.03  0.00 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03     
Area (0.42)  (0.03) (1.07) (0.46) (0.37) (0.43) (0.42) (0.42)     
Age of Original  0.93***   0.76*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.94*** 0.93*** 0.94***     
Squatter<50 (6.48)   (6.28) (5.95) (13.02) (6.54) (6.50) (6.56)     
Female Original Squatter -0.15   -0.02 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15     
  (1.03)   (0.19) (1.01) (1.00) (1.01) (1.02) (1.02)     
Argentine Original  0.26   0.21 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28     
Squatter (0.72)   (0.69) (0.71) (0.78) (0.76) (0.75) (0.79)     
Years of Education of the  -0.01   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01     
Original Squatter (0.35)   (0.17) (0.36) (0.46) (0.35) (0.36) (0.31)     
Argentine Father of the  -0.29   -0.15 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.30 -0.31     
Original Squatter (1.03)   (0.57) (0.94) (1.00) (1.02) (1.05) (1.09)     
Years of Education of  -0.13**   -0.13** -0.13** -0.13*** -0.13* -0.13* -0.13**     
Original Squatter’s Father (1.99)   (2.36) (2.18) (3.07) (1.95) (1.95) (2.02)     
Argentine Mother of the  -0.22   -0.29 -0.22 -0.22 -0.23 -0.23 -0.20     
Original Squatter (0.78)   (1.12) (0.61) (1.56) (0.81) (0.80) (0.70)     
Years of Educ of Original 0.05   0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05     
Squatter’s Mother (0.70)   (0.74) (0.64) (0.53) (0.70) (0.69) (0.75)     
Constant 1.17** 1.06*** 1.07*** 1.12** 1.17** 1.17*** 1.12** 1.12** 1.03*     
  (2.09) (9.82) (2.66) (2.51) (2.12) (3.65) (1.97) (1.97) (1.82)     
F-stat         2.19     
Observations 313 313 313 425 313 313 313 313 313 290 145 217 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of sons or daughters of the household head between 5 and 13 years old living in the house. The household is the unit of observation. 
Column (1) is summarized in Column 5 of Table 5. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls for parcel characteristics. Column (4) adds the observations for 
the San Martin neighborhood. Standard errors clustered at the block level are used in Column (5), and at the former owner level in Column (6). The reduced-form regression on the 
intention-to-treat variable Property Right Offer is displayed in Column (7). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable Property Right with the intention-to-treat 
variable Property Right Offer) is presented in Column (8). Column (9) is the regression summarized in Column 6 of Table 5, which shows separately the effect of early and late 
treatments. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. For treatment, early treatment and late treatment, respectively, Columns (10) through 
(12) present the matching estimates using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (with bootstrapped standard errors). The control variables are described in Appendix 
Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix Table A.11 – NUMBER OF OFFSPRING OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 0-4 YEARS OLD 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Property Right -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07*  -0.00  -0.06    
  (1.03) (1.05) (1.01) (1.09) (0.91) (1.80)  (0.04)  (0.71)    
Property Right Offer       -0.00       
        (0.04)       
Property Right 1989         -0.08  -0.05   
          (0.81)  (0.42)   
Property Right 1998         -0.07   -0.04 
          (0.86)   (0.49) 
Parcel Surface 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
  (0.78)  (0.93) (0.23) (0.67) (0.85) (0.86) (0.87) (0.79)     
Distance to Creek -0.01  0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01     
  (0.21)  (0.04) (0.68) (0.20) (0.31) (0.03) (0.03) (0.17)     
Block Corner -0.03  0.00 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03     
  (0.32)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.37) (0.31) (0.24) (0.24) (0.32)     
Distance to Non Squatted 0.03  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03     
Area (0.74)  (0.96) (0.99) (0.75) (0.64) (0.74) (0.74) (0.73)     
Age of Original  0.15**   0.15*** 0.15** 0.15*** 0.16** 0.16** 0.15**     
Squatter<50 (2.23)   (2.60) (2.12) (4.65) (2.29) (2.28) (2.22)     
Female Original Squatter 0.04   0.10* 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04     
  (0.55)   (1.70) (0.58) (0.80) (0.57) (0.57) (0.55)     
Argentine Original  -0.28   -0.29* -0.28* -0.28*** -0.26 -0.26 -0.28     
Squatter (1.65)   (1.94) (1.85) (4.87) (1.55) (1.55) (1.64)     
Years of Education of the  0.01   -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01     
Original Squatter (0.51)   (1.01) (0.59) (0.66) (0.50) (0.50) (0.51)     
Argentine Father of the  0.11   0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11     
Original Squatter (0.81)   (0.81) (1.09) (1.38) (0.74) (0.74) (0.80)     
Years of Education of  -0.00   -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00     
Original Squatter’s Father (0.05)   (0.01) (0.05) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)     
Argentine Mother of the  0.02   0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02     
Original Squatter (0.16)   (0.27) (0.20) (0.34) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16)     
Years of Educ of Original -0.03   -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03     
Squatter’s Mother (0.89)   (0.17) (0.91) (0.95) (0.94) (0.94) (0.88)     
Constant 0.32 0.33*** 0.15 0.35* 0.32 0.32 0.25 0.25 0.31     
  (1.20) (6.78) (0.84) (1.65) (1.09) (1.63) (0.91) (0.92) (1.16)     
F-stat         0.01     
Observations 313 313 313 425 313 313 313 313 313 290 145 217 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of sons or daughters of the household head between 0 and 4 years old living in the house. The household is the unit of observation. 
Column (1) is summarized in Column 7 of Table 5. Column (2) includes no controls, and Column (3) only controls for parcel characteristics. Column (4) adds the observations for 
the San Martin neighborhood. Standard errors clustered at the block level are used in Column (5), and at the former owner level in Column (6). The reduced-form regression on the 
intention-to-treat variable Property Right Offer is displayed in Column (7). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable Property Right with the intention-to-treat 
variable Property Right Offer) is presented in Column (8). Column (9) is the regression summarized in Column 8 of Table 5, which shows separately the effect of early and late 
treatments. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. For treatment, early treatment and late treatment, respectively, Columns (10) through 
(12) present the matching estimate using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (with bootstrapped standard errors). The control variables are described in Appendix 
Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix Table A.12 – SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT (OFFSPRING OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 6-20 YEARS OLD) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
0.22 0.18 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.22  0.44*  0.08   
Property Right 
(1.15) (0.98) (1.31) (1.04) (1.15) (0.82)  (1.8)  (0.33)   
       0.40*      
Property Right Offer 
       (1.81)      
         0.69**  1.19***  
Property Right 1989 
         (2.29)  (2.77)  
         0.03   -0.17 
Property Right 1998 
         (0.13)     (0.54) 
0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00       
Parcel Surface 
(0.69)  (0.34) (0.62) (0.62) (0.73) (0.25) (0.56) (0.79)       
0.12  0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.07       
Distance to Creek 
(1.11)  (1.18) (0.98) (1.06) (1.14) (1.48) (1.31) (0.59)       
-0.52*  -0.29 -0.52 -0.52 -0.52* -0.38 -0.47 -0.49*       
Block Corner 
(1.82)  (1.09) (1.49) (1.55) (1.83) (1.26) (1.63) (1.70)       
-0.12  -0.08 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 -0.10       Distance to Non-Squatted 
Area (1.08) -0.25 (0.71) (0.97) (0.92) (1.1) (1.21) (1.24) (0.95)       
-0.24 (1.37) -0.23 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.22 -0.25 -0.24       
Male 
(1.35) -0.34*** (1.26) (1.39) (1.39) (1.59) (1.24) (1.36) (1.31)       
-0.35*** (15.72) -0.34*** -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.34*** -0.35*** -0.34***       
Child Age 
(16.31)  (15.77) (14.1) (12.57) (9.89) (16.34) (16.31) (16.21)       
-0.14   -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 -0.16       Age of Original 
Squatter<50 (0.66)   (0.57) (0.62) (0.71) (0.64) (0.59) (0.78)       
-0.47**   -0.47** -0.47** -0.47** -0.46** -0.45** -0.50***       
Female Original Squatter  
(2.51)   (2.23) (2.35) (2.91) (2.47) (2.38) (2.66)       
0.66   0.66 0.66 0.66** 0.75 0.73 0.54       Argentine Original 
Squatter (1.19)   (1.19) (1.31) (2.52) (1.35) (1.31) (0.97)       
0.17***   0.17** 0.17** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.17***       Years of Education of the 
Original Squatter (2.96)   (2.55) (2.39) (3.00) (2.89) (2.82) (2.93)       
-1.29***   -1.29*** -1.29*** -1.29*** -1.41*** -1.37*** -1.20***       Argentine Father of the 
Original Squatter (3.15)   (3.51) (3.63) (4.92) (3.38) (3.31) (2.93)       
0.06   0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07       Years of Education of 
Original Squatter’s Father (0.72)   (0.74) (0.71) (0.70) (0.75) (0.74) (0.76)       
0.16   0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.08       Argentine Mother of the 
Original Squatter (0.46)   (0.41) (0.47) (0.44) (0.43) (0.54) (0.23)       
0.01   0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01       Years of Education of 
Original Squatter’s Mother (0.08)   (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.14) (0.08)       
2.64*** 2.96*** 3.02*** 2.64*** 2.64*** 2.64*** 2.35*** 2.45*** 2.91***       
Constant 
(3.13) (8.93) (5.1) (3.01) (3.24) (3.98) (2.72) (2.86) (3.42)       
F-stat          4.09**       
Observations 436 436 436 436 436 436 436 436 436 382 165 292 
Notes: The dependent variable is the difference between the school grade each child is currently attending or the maximum grade attained (if not attending school) minus the 
grade corresponding to the child age. The child is the unit of observation. Column (1) is summarized in Column 1 of Table 6. Column (2) only controls for child age and gender. 
Column (3) controls for child age, child gender and parcel characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the household level are used in Column (4), at the block level in Column 
(4), and at the former owner level in Column (6). The reduced-form regression on the intention-to-treat variable Property Right Offer is displayed in Column (7). The 2SLS 
regression (instrumenting the treatment variable Property Right with the intention-to-treat variable Property Right Offer) is presented in Column (8). Column (9) is the regression 
summarized in Column 2 of Table 6, which shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 
1998. For treatment, early treatment and late treatment, respectively, Columns (10) through (12) present the matching estimates using the propensity score of the probability of 
attrition (with bootstrapped standard errors). The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix Table A.13 – PRIMARY SCHOOL COMPLETION (OFFSPRING OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 13-20 YEARS OLD) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02  0.06  -0.01   
Property Right 
(0.45) (0.34) (0.64) (0.44) (0.42) (0.63)  (1.12)  (0.15)   
       0.06      
Property Right Offer 
       (1.13)      
         0.01  0.00  
Property Right 1989 
         (0.12)  (0.03)  
         0.02   0.04 
Property Right 1998 
         (0.49)   (0.61) 
0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00       
Parcel Surface 
(0.40)  (0.41) (0.4) (0.40) (0.44) (0.64) (0.51) (0.41)       
0.01  -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01       
Distance to Creek 
(0.36)  (0.26) (0.32) (0.36) (0.39) (0.60) (0.52) (0.4)       
-0.05  0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05       
Block Corner 
(0.74)  (0.11) (0.74) (0.80) (1.44) (0.44) (0.63) (0.74)       
-0.03  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03       Distance to Non-Squatted 
Area (1.17)  (1.26) (1.19) (1.46) (1.89) (1.31) (1.32) (1.17)       
-0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02       
Male 
(0.52) (0.18) (0.26) (0.59) (0.65) (0.58) (0.44) (0.51) (0.54)       
0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***       
Child Age 
(5.50) (5.26) (5.27) (4.72) (4.45) (6.19) (5.55) (5.49) (5.5)       
0.05   0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05       Age of Original 
Squatter<50 (1.07)   (1.00) (0.99) (1.16) (1.10) (1.12) (1.07)       
-0.11**   -0.11** -0.11** -0.11** -0.10** -0.10** -0.10**       
Female Original Squatter  
(2.31)   (2.03) (2.09) (2.3) (2.28) (2.19) (2.29)       
-0.05   -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05       Argentine Original 
Squatter (0.36)   (0.48) (0.59) (0.81) (0.25) (0.26) (0.34)       
0.03**   0.03** 0.03** 0.03* 0.03** 0.03** 0.03**       Years of Education of the 
Original Squatter (2.46)   (2.47) (2.52) (2.01) (2.43) (2.42) (2.45)       
-0.08   -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09       Argentine Father of the 
Original Squatter (0.87)   (1.13) (1.17) (1.51) (1.06) (1.01) (0.88)       
0.05**   0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05**       Years of Education of 
Original Squatter’s Father (2.35)   (3.07) (3.64) (4.79) (2.37) (2.37) (2.34)       
-0.07   -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07       Argentine Mother of the 
Original Squatter (0.85)   (0.82) (0.87) (0.96) (0.85) (0.80) (0.83)       
-0.02   -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02       Years of Education of 
Original Squatter’s 
Mother 
(0.99)   (1.07) (1.10) (1.37) (1.03) (0.96) (0.97)       
-0.18 -0.03 -0.01 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.23 -0.22 -0.19       
Constant 
(0.75) (0.21) (0.04) (0.68) (0.71) (0.85) (0.95) (0.91) (0.77)       
F-stat          0.04       
Observations 290 290 290 290 290 290 2.90 290 290 250 100 195 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the child has finished primary school, and 0 otherwise. The child is the unit of observation. Column (1) is summarized 
in Column 3 of Table 6. Column (2) only controls for child age and gender. Column (3) controls for child age, child gender and parcel characteristics. Standard errors clustered at 
the household level are used in Column (4), at the block level in Column (4), and at the former owner level in Column (6). The reduced-form regression on the intention-to-treat 
variable Property Right Offer is displayed in Column (7). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable Property Right with the intention-to-treat variable Property 
Right Offer) is presented in Column (8). Column (9) is the regression summarized in Column 4 of Table 6, which shows separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-
stat tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. For treatment, early treatment and late treatment, respectively, Columns (10) through (12) present the 
matching estimates using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (with bootstrapped standard errors). The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix Table A.14 – SECONDARY SCHOOL COMPLETION (OFFSPRING OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 18-20 YEARS OLD) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
0.06 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.06  0.10  0.18**   
Property Right 
(0.72) (1.22) (1.09) (0.68) (0.60) (0.53)  (0.87)  (2.19)   
       0.09      
Property Right Offer 
       (0.87)      
         0.27*  0.59***  
Property Right 1989 
         (1.93)  (3.16)  
         -0.01   0.06 
Property Right 1998 
         (0.12)   (0.63) 
0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00       
Parcel Surface 
(0.30)  (0.45) (0.30) (0.30) (0.5) (0.44) (0.39) (0.08)       
0.05  0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.02       
Distance to Creek 
(1.04)  (1.60) (0.95) (0.83) (0.62) (1.15) (1.10) (0.49)       
-0.22  -0.21 -0.22** -0.22** -0.22* -0.19 -0.21 -0.22       
Block Corner 
(1.50)  (1.58) (2.07) (2.23) (2.11) (1.31) (1.43) (1.54)       
0.06  0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06       Distance to Non-Squatted 
Area (1.14)  (1.43) (1.03) (0.86) (1.31) (1.09) (1.07) (1.20)       
0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05       
Male 
(0.42) (0.17) (0.18) (0.44) (0.41) (0.79) (0.49) (0.42) (0.55)       
0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14**       
Child Age 
(2.76) (2.72) (2.82) (2.93) (2.95) (5.72) (2.77) (2.78) (2.53)       
-0.08   -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08       Age of Original 
Squatter<50 (0.91)   (0.89) (0.88) (1.55) (0.92) (0.83) (0.85)       
-0.11   -0.11 -0.11 -0.11* -0.11 -0.11 -0.11       
Female Original Squatter  
(1.29)   (1.25) (1.32) (2.02) (1.29) (1.23) (1.31)       
0.49*   0.49** 0.49** 0.49** 0.50* 0.49* 0.39       Argentine Original 
Squatter (1.74)   (2.57) (2.59) (3.01) (1.78) (1.76) (1.40)       
0.04   0.04 0.04 0.04** 0.04 0.04 0.04       Years of Education of the 
Original Squatter (1.53)   (1.44) (1.60) (2.77) (1.52) (1.52) (1.57)       
-0.39*   -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.40* -0.39* -0.29       Argentine Father of the 
Original Squatter (1.91)   (4.17) (4.69) (4.87) (1.95) (1.93) (1.42)       
-0.01   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01       Years of Education of 
Original Squatter’s Father (0.15)   (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14)       
0.22   0.22** 0.22* 0.22** 0.21 0.22 0.18       Argentine Mother of the 
Original Squatter (1.26)   (2.15) (1.99) (2.60) (1.2) (1.26) (1.04)       
-0.04   -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04       Years of Education of 
Original Squatter’s 
Mother 
(1.04)   (1.03) (1.04) (1.28) (1.11) (1.06) (1.05)       
-3.06*** -2.60** -2.96*** -3.06*** -3.06*** -3.06*** -3.12*** -3.13*** -2.72**       
Constant 
(2.75) (2.46) (2.76) (2.94) (3.15) (5.38) (2.78) (2.78) (2.43)       
F-stat         3.52*       
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 109 38 81 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the child has finished secondary school, and 0 otherwise. The child is the unit of observation. Column (1) is 
summarized in Column 5 of Table 6. Column (2) only controls for child age and gender. Column (3) controls for child age, child gender and parcel characteristics. Standard 
errors clustered at the household level are used in Column (4), at the block level in Column (4), and at the former owner level in Column (6). The reduced-form regression on the 
intention-to-treat variable Property Right Offer is displayed in Column (7). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable Property Right with the intention-to-treat 
variable Property Right Offer) is presented in Column (8). Column (9) is the regression summarized in Column 6 of Table 6, which shows separately the effect of early and late 
treatments. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. For treatment, early treatment and late treatment, respectively, Columns (10) 
through (12) present the matching estimates using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (with bootstrapped standard errors). The control variables are described in 
Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix Table A.15 – POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION (OFFSPRING OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 18-20 YEARS OLD) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
0.11* 0.09* 0.09* 0.11* 0.11 0.11*  0.10  0.11**   
Property Right 
(1.91) (1.76) (1.67) (1.87) (1.45) (1.94)  (1.44)  (2.44)   
       0.09      
Property Right Offer 
       (1.43)      
         0.20**  0.27*  
Property Right 1989 
         (2.23)  (1.67)  
         0.07   0.08* 
Property Right 1998 
         (1.18)   (1.94) 
0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00       
Parcel Surface 
(0.87)  (0.47) (0.89) (1.05) (1.43) (0.90) (0.83) (0.72)       
0.05  0.05* 0.05 0.05 0.05** 0.05* 0.05 0.04       
Distance to Creek 
(1.63)  (1.70) (1.62) (1.60) (2.32) (1.67) (1.59) (1.20)       
-0.06  -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06       
Block Corner 
(0.61)  (0.72) (1.02) (1.02) (1.05) (0.47) (0.62) (0.63)       
0.04  0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04* 0.05 0.05 0.05       Distance to Non-Squatted 
Area (1.34)  (1.49) (1.49) (1.67) (1.98) (1.36) (1.34) (1.38)       
0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05* 0.06 0.05 0.06       
Male 
(0.98) (0.86) (0.81) (1.01) (0.95) (1.94) (1.07) (0.98) (1.07)       
0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06** 0.06* 0.06** 0.06 0.06 0.05       
Child Age 
(1.65) (1.38) (1.45) (2.11) (1.85) (2.42) (1.60) (1.64) (1.47)       
-0.01   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00       Age of Original 
Squatter<50 (0.10)   (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.24) (0.11) (0.06)       
-0.01   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01       
Female Original Squatter  
(0.13)   (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.13) (0.13)       
0.10   0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.06       Argentine Original 
Squatter (0.55)   (0.5) (0.65) (1.49) (0.56) (0.55) (0.31)       
-0.01   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01       Years of Education of the 
Original Squatter (0.56)   (0.61) (0.57) (1.00) (0.55) (0.56) (0.55)       
-0.34**   -0.34* -0.34** -0.34*** -0.34** -0.34** -0.30**       Argentine Father of the 
Original Squatter (2.57)   (1.93) (2.13) (7.87) (2.57) (2.56) (2.18)       
0.04*   0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04* 0.04* 0.04*       Years of Education of 
Original Squatter’s Father (1.82)   (1.48) (1.24) (1.33) (1.80) (1.81) (1.84)       
0.14   0.14 0.14 0.14** 0.13 0.14 0.13       Argentine Mother of the 
Original Squatter (1.25)   (1.59) (1.65) (2.57) (1.14) (1.25) (1.09)       
-0.03   -0.03 -0.03 -0.03* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03       Years of Education of 
Original Squatter’s 
Mother 
(1.12)   (1.31) (1.25) (2.05) (1.18) (1.11) (1.11)       
-1.28* -0.91 -1.17* -1.28** -1.28* -1.28** -1.25* -1.27* -1.11       
Constant 
(1.76) (1.34) (1.68) (2.21) (1.82) (2.42) (1.70) (1.73) (1.52)       
F-stat         1.76       
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 109 38 81 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the child has started post-secondary education (terciary or universitary), and 0 otherwise. The child is the unit of 
observation. Column (1) is summarized in Column 7 of Table 6. Column (2) only controls for child age and gender. Column (3) controls for child age, child gender and parcel 
characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the household level are used in Column (4), at the block level in Column (4), and at the former owner level in Column (6). The 
reduced-form regression on the intention-to-treat variable Property Right Offer is displayed in Column (7). The 2SLS regression (instrumenting the treatment variable Property 
Right with the intention-to-treat variable Property Right Offer) is presented in Column (8). Column (9) is the regression summarized in Column 8 of Table 6, which shows 
separately the effect of early and late treatments. The F-stat tests the null hypothesis: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. For treatment, early treatment and late 
treatment, respectively, Columns (10) through (12) present the matching estimates using the propensity score of the probability of attrition (with bootstrapped standard errors). 
The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix Table A.16 – ACCESS TO CREDIT 
Credit Card 
& Bank Account 
Non-Mortgage Loan 
Received 
Informal Credit Grocery Store Credit Mortgage Loan 
Received 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Property Right -0.01  0.01  -0.06  0.01  0.02  
 (0.71)  (0.19)  (1.00)  (0.16)  (1.58)  
Property Right 1989  -0.01  0.01  -0.04  0.02  0.04*** 
  (0.41)  (0.24)  (0.50)  (0.31)  (3.19) 
Property Right 1998  -0.02  0.00  -0.07  0.00  0.00 
  (0.70)  (0.11)  (1.03)  (0.01)  (0.06) 
Parcel Surface 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (1.24) (1.24) (0.50) (0.50) (1.10) (1.11) (0.64) (0.65) (0.38) (0.30) 
Distance to Creek 0.02* 0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 (1.95) (1.82) (0.71) (0.72) (0.98) (1.03) (0.29) (0.36) (0.34) (0.51) 
Block Corner -0.00 -0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.13 -0.13 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) (1.06) (1.06) (1.60) (1.59) (0.30) (0.30) (1.37) (1.41) 
Distance to Non-Squatted  0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 
Area (0.19) (0.19) (1.62) (1.62) (0.07) (0.06) (1.22) (1.22) (0.44) (0.43) 
Age of Original Squatter<50 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.10* 0.10 0.07 0.06 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.53) (0.53) (0.66) (0.65) (1.65) (1.63) (1.24) (1.22) (0.34) (0.49) 
Female Original Squatter -0.00 -0.00 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.08 0.01 0.00 
 (0.20) (0.21) (1.32) (1.32) (0.28) (0.28) (1.44) (1.44) (0.52) (0.51) 
Argentine Original Squatter -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.22* 0.22* 0.01 0.00 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.17) (0.17) (0.04) (0.02) (1.71) (1.69) (0.31) (0.16) 
Years of Education of the  0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Original Squatter (1.34) (1.33) (0.25) (0.25) (1.06) (1.07) (0.33) (0.34) (0.70) (0.62) 
Argentine Father of the  -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 0.15 0.15 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 
Original Squatter (0.60) (0.59) (1.03) (1.03) (1.27) (1.28) (0.17) (0.16) (0.01) (0.10) 
Years of Education of  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01* 
Original Squatter’s Father (2.82) (2.82) (0.14) (0.14) (1.19) (1.19) (0.72) (0.72) (1.65) (1.72) 
Argentine Mother of the  0.03 0.03 0.10 0.10 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
Original Squatter (0.77) (0.76) (1.34) (1.33) (0.17) (0.18) (0.03) (0.04) (0.24) (0.11) 
Years of Education of  -0.02* -0.02* 0.04** 0.04** 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.01* -0.01* 
Original Squatter’s Mother (1.75) (1.75) (2.09) (2.08) (1.31) (1.29) (0.53) (0.52) (1.68) (1.79) 
Constant -0.14* -0.14* 0.06 0.06 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 -0.03 -0.01 
 (1.77) (1.72) (0.40) (0.42) (1.03) (1.07) (1.24) (1.26) (0.82) (0.35) 
F-stat  0.02  0.02  0.10  0.08  8.61*** 
Observations 312 312 312 312 302 302 312 312 312 312 
Notes: Credit Card & Bank Account is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the household head has a credit card or bank account, and 0 otherwise. Non-Mortgage Loan 
Received and Mortgage Loan Received are dummy variables that equal 1 if the household has ever received from a bank, government, union, or cooperative, formal 
non-mortgage credit or formal mortgage credit, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Informal Credit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the household has received informal 
credit from relatives, colleagues, neighbors or friends in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. Grocery Store Credit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the household 
usually receives on trust credit from grocery stores, and 0 otherwise. The household is the unit of observation. Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9) and (10) are summarized in 
Table 7. The F-stat test the null hypotheses: Property Right 1989 = Property Right 1998. The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute values of 
t statistics are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix Table A.17 – LABOR MARKET 
Household Head 
Income 
Total Household 
Income 
Total Household 
Income per Capita 
Total Household 
Income per Adult 
Employed Household 
Head 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Property Right -27.35  -43.56  1.04  -4.45  0.03  
 (1.10)  (1.27)  (0.13)  (0.38)  (0.63)  
Property Right 1989  -22.07  -32.71  8.91  -6.89  0.05 
  (0.63)  (0.69)  (0.82)  (0.43)  (0.64) 
Property Right 1998  -30.34  -49.85  -3.52  -3.04  0.02 
  (1.06)  (1.27)  (0.39)  (0.23)  (0.43) 
Parcel Surface -0.10 -0.10 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.62) (0.62) (0.05) (0.04) (0.21) (0.22) (0.10) (0.10) (0.94) (0.94) 
Distance to Creek 8.25 7.45 13.69 11.98 2.83 1.59 0.66 1.05 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.63) (0.55) (0.76) (0.64) (0.69) (0.37) (0.11) (0.17) (0.32) (0.38) 
Block Corner 29.72 30.02 32.25 32.54 12.97 13.18 14.00 13.93 -0.11 -0.11 
 (0.80) (0.80) (0.62) (0.63) (1.10) (1.11) (0.80) (0.80) (1.46) (1.45) 
Distance to Non-Squatted  0.59 0.73 10.95 11.20 0.72 0.91 1.29 1.23 0.06** 0.06** 
Area (0.05) (0.06) (0.64) (0.66) (0.19) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (2.24) (2.23) 
Age of Original Squatter<50 17.67 17.50 -17.51 -18.21 -12.50 -13.01 8.30 8.46 0.09* 0.08* 
 (0.70) (0.70) (0.51) (0.52) (1.58) (1.64) (0.71) (0.72) (1.68) (1.65) 
Female Original Squatter -50.45** -50.21** -62.87* -62.54* -8.49 -8.26 -14.47 -14.54 -0.10* -0.10* 
 (2.01) (1.99) (1.80) (1.78) (1.06) (1.03) (1.22) (1.23) (1.96) (1.96) 
Argentine Original Squatter -15.10 -15.67 18.43 17.40 29.03 28.28 39.15 39.38 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.22) (0.21) (1.51) (1.47) (1.38) (1.39) (0.37) (0.38) 
Years of Education of the  3.20 3.14 9.52 9.44 5.29** 5.23** 4.13 4.15 0.01 0.01 
Original Squatter (0.46) (0.45) (0.99) (0.98) (2.40) (2.37) (1.27) (1.27) (0.59) (0.58) 
Argentine Father of the  -20.68 -20.47 -9.10 -8.62 -20.63 -20.28 -40.66* -40.77* 0.07 0.07 
Original Squatter (0.44) (0.44) (0.14) (0.13) (1.38) (1.36) (1.85) (1.85) (0.67) (0.68) 
Years of Education of  4.36 4.40 23.45 23.51 2.88 2.93 -1.35 -1.36 0.01 0.01 
Original Squatter’s Father (0.41) (0.41) (1.45) (1.45) (0.78) (0.79) (0.25) (0.25) (0.48) (0.49) 
Argentine Mother of the  20.29 19.78 -69.84 -71.01 -3.35 -4.20 3.87 4.14 0.00 0.00 
Original Squatter (0.44) (0.43) (1.09) (1.10) (0.23) (0.29) (0.18) (0.19) (0.05) (0.03) 
Years of Education of  -10.69 -10.80 -2.67 -2.88 -4.09 -4.24 -2.35 -2.31 -0.01 -0.01 
Original Squatter’s Mother (0.92) (0.93) (0.16) (0.17) (1.09) (1.13) (0.42) (0.41) (0.40) (0.41) 
Constant 313.47*** 316.34*** 246.89* 253.17* 44.44 48.99 97.59** 96.18** 0.67*** 0.68*** 
 (3.34) (3.33) (1.88) (1.90) (1.48) (1.61) (2.20) (2.14) (3.41) (3.41) 
F-stat  0.05  0.11  1.10  0.05  0.07 
Observations 251 251 255 255 255 255 255 255 310 310 
Notes: Household Head Income is the total income earned by the household head in the previous month. Total Household Income is the total income earned by all the 
household members in the previous month. Total Household Income per Capita is Total Household Income divided by the number of household members. Total 
Household Income per Adult is Total Household Income divided by the number of household members older than 16 years old. All income variables are measured in 
Argentine pesos. Employed Household Head is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the household head was employed the week before the survey, and 0 otherwise. The 
household is the unit of observation. Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), and (9) are summarized in Table 8. The F-stat test the null hypotheses: Property Right 1989 = Property 
Right 1998.  The control variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
 
